Integrated Diabetes Care (II)

Here’s my first post about the book. In this post I’ll provide some coverage of the last half of the text.

Some stuff from the chapters dealing with the UK:

“we now know that reducing the HbA1c too far and fast in some patients can be harmful [7]. This is a particularly important issue, where primary care is paid through the Quality Outcomes Framework (QoF), a general practice “pay for performance” programme [8]. A major item within QoF, is the proportion of patients below HbA1c criteria: such reporting is not linked to rates of hypoglycaemia, ambulance call outs or hospitalisation, i.e., a practice could receive a high payment through achieving the QoF target, but with a high hospitalisation/ambulance callout rate.”

“nationwide audit data for England 2009–2010 showed that […] targets for HbA1c (≤7.5%/58.5 mmol/mol), blood pressure (BP) (<140/80 mmHg) and total cholesterol (

One thing that is perhaps worth noting here before moving any further is that the fact that you have actual data on this stuff is in itself indicative of an at least reasonable standard of care, compared to many places; in a lot of countries you just don’t have data on this kind of stuff, and it seems highly unlikely to me that the default assumption should be that things are going great in places where you do not have data on this kind of thing. Denmark also, incidentally, has a similar audit system, the results of which I’ve discussed in some detail before here on the blog).

“Our local audit data shows that approximately 85–90 % of patients with diabetes are managed by GPs and practice nurses in Coventry and Warwickshire. Only a small proportion of newly diagnosed patients with T2D (typically around 5–10 %) who attend the DESMOND (Diabetes Education and Self-Management for Ongoing and Newly Diagnosed) education programme come into contact with some aspect of the specialist services [12]. […] Payment by results (PBR) has […] actively, albeit indirectly, disincentivised primary care to seek opinion from specialist services [13]. […] Large volumes of data are collected by various services ranging between primary care, local laboratory facilities, ambulance services, hospital clinics (of varying specialties), retinal screening services and several allied healthcare professionals. However, the majority of these systems are not unified and therefore result in duplication of data collection and lack of data utilisation beyond the purpose of collection. This can result in missed opportunities, delayed communication, inability to use electronic solutions (prompts, alerts, algorithms etc.), inefficient use of resources and patient fatigue (repeated testing but no apparent benefit). Thus, in the majority of the regions in England, the delivery of diabetes care is disjointed and lacks integration. Each service collects and utilises data for their own “narrow” purpose, which could be used in a holistic way […] Potential consequences of the introduction of multiple service providers are fragmentation of care, reductions in continuity of care and propagation of a reluctance to refer on to a more specialist service [9]. […] There are calls for more integration and less fragmentation in health-care [30], yet so far, the major integration projects in England have revealed negligible, if any, benefits [25, 32]. […] to provide high quality care and reduce the cost burden of diabetes, any integrated diabetes care models must prioritise prevention and early aggressive intervention over downstream interventions (secondary and tertiary prevention).”

“It is estimated that 99 % of diabetes care is self-management […] people with diabetes spend approximately only 3 h a year with healthcare professionals (versus 8757 h of self-management)” [this is a funny way of looking at things, which I’d never really considered before.]

“In a traditional model of diabetes care the rigid divide between primary and specialist care is exacerbated by the provision of funding. For example the tariff system used in England, to pay for activity in specialist care, can create incentives for one part of the system to “hold on” to patients who might be better treated elsewhere. This system was originally introduced to incentivise providers to increase elective activity and reduce waiting times. Whilst it has been effective for improving access to planned care, it is not so well suited to achieving the continuity of care needed to facilitate integrated care [37].”

“Currently in the UK there is a miss-match between what the healthcare policies require and what the workforce is actually being trained for. […]  For true integrated care in diabetes and the other long term condition specialties to work, the education and training needs for both general practitioners and hospital specialists need to be more closely aligned.”

The chapter on Germany (Baden-Württemberg):

“An analysis of the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) from 2012 shows that more than 50 % of German people over 65 years suffer from at least one chronic disease, approximately 50 % suffer from two to four chronic diseases, and over a quarter suffer from five or more diseases [3]. […] Currently the public sector covers the majority (77 %) of health expenditures in Germany […] An estimated number of 56.3 million people are living with diabetes in Europe [16]. […]  The mean age of the T2DM-cohort [from Kinzigtal, Germany] in 2013 was 71.2 years and 53.5 % were women. In 2013 the top 5 co-morbidities of patients with T2DM were essential hypertension (78.3 %), dyslipidaemia (50.5 %), disorders of refraction and accommodation (38.2 %), back pain (33.8 %) and obesity (33.3 %). […] T2DM in Kinzigtal was associated with mean expenditure of 5,935.70 € per person in 2013 (not necessarily only for diabetes care ) including 40 % from inpatient stays, 24 % from drug prescriptions, 19 % from physician remuneration in ambulatory care and the rest from remedies and adjuvants (e.g., insulin pen systems, wheelchairs, physiotherapy, etc.), work incapacity or rehabilitation.”

-ll- Netherlands:

“Zhang et al. [10] […] reported that globally, 12 % of health expenditures […] per person were spent on diabetes in 2010. The expenditure varies by region, age group, gender, and country’s income level.”

“Over the years many approaches [have been] introduced to improve the quality and continuity of care for chronic diseases. […] the Dutch minister of health approved, in 2007, the introduction of bundled-care (known is the Netherlands as a ‘chain-of-care’) approach for integrated chronic care, with special attention to diabetes. […] With a bundled payment approach – or episode-based payment – multiple providers are reimbursed a single sum of money for all services related to an episode of care (e.g., hospitalisation, including a period of post-acute care). This is in contrast to a reimbursement for each individual service (fee-for-service), and it is expected that this will reduce the volume of services provided and consequently lead to a reduction in spending. Since in a fee-for-service system the reimbursement is directly related to the volume of services provided, there is little incentive to reduce unnecessary care. The bundled payment approach promotes [in theory… – US] a more efficient use of services [26] […] As far as efficiency […] is concerned, after 3 years of evaluation, several changes in care processes have been observed, including task substitution from GPs to practice nurses and increased coordination of care [31, 36], thus improving process costs. However, Elissen et al. [31] concluded that the evidence relating to changes in process and outcome indicators, remains open to doubt, and only modest improvements were shown in most indicators. […] Overall, while the Dutch approach to integrated care, using a bundled payment system with a mixed payer approach, has created a limited improvement in integration, there is no evidence that the approach has reduced morbidity and premature mortality: and it has come at an increased cost.”

-ll- Sweden:

“In 2013 Sweden spent the equivalent of 4,904 USD per capita on health [OECD average: 3,453 USD], with 84 % of the expenditure coming from public sources [OECD average: 73 %]. […] Similarly high proportions [of public spending] can be found in the Netherlands (88 %), Norway (85 %) and Denmark (84 %) [11]. […] Sweden’s quality registers, for tracking the quality of care that patients receive and the corresponding outcomes for several conditions, are among the most developed across the OECD [17]. Yet, the coordination of care for patients with complex needs is less good. Only one in six patients had contact with a physician or specialist nurse after discharge from hospital for stroke, again with substantial variation across counties. Fewer than half of patients with type 1 diabetes […] have their blood pressure adequately controlled, with a considerable variation (from 26 % to 68 %) across counties [17]. […] at 260 admissions per 100,000 people aged over 80, avoidable hospital admissions for uncontrolled diabetes in Sweden’s elderly population are the sixth highest in the OECD, and about 1.5 times higher than in Denmark.”

“Waiting times [in Sweden] have long been a cause of dissatisfaction [19]. In an OECD ranking of 2011, Sweden was rated second worst [20]. […] Sweden introduced a health-care guarantee in 2005 [guaranteeing fast access in some specific contexts]. […] Most patients who appeal under the health-care guarantee and [are] prioritised in the “queue” ha[ve] acute conditions rather than medical problems as a consequence of an underlying chronic disease. Patients waiting for a hip replacement or a cataract surgery are cured after surgery and no life-long follow-up is needed. When such patients are prioritised, the long-term care for patients with chronic diseases is “crowded out,” lowering their priority and risking worse outcomes. The health-care guarantee can therefore lead to longer intervals between checkups, with difficulties in accessing health care if their pre-existing condition has deteriorated.”

“Within each region / county council the care of patients with diabetes is divided. Patients with type 1 diabetes get their care at specialist clinics in hospitals and the majority of patients with type 2 diabetes in primary care . Patients with type 2 diabetes who have severe complications are referred to the Diabetes Clinics at the hospital. Approximately 10 % of all patients with type 2 continue their care at the hospital clinics. They are almost always on insulin in high doses often in combination with oral agents but despite massive medication many of these patients have difficulties to achieve metabolic balance. Patients with advanced complications such as foot ulcers, macroangiopathic manifestations and treatment with dialysis are also treated at the hospitals.”

Do keep in mind here that even if only 10% of type 2 patients are treated in a hospital setting, type 2 patients may still make up perhaps half or more of the diabetes patients treated in a hospital setting; type 2 prevalence is much, much higher than type 1 prevalence. Also, in view of such treatment- and referral patterns the default assumption when doing comparative subgroup analyses should always be that the outcomes of type 2 patients treated in a hospital setting should be expected to be much worse than the outcomes of type 2 patients treated in general practice; they’re in much poorer health than the diabetics treated in general practice, or they wouldn’t be treated in a hospital setting in the first place. A related point is that regardless of how great the hospitals are at treating the type 2 patients (maybe in some contexts there isn’t actually much of a difference in outcomes between these patients and type 2 patients treated in general practice, even though you’d expect there to be one?), that option will usually not be scalable. Also, it’s to be expected that these patients are more expensive than the default type 2 patient treated by his GP [and they definitely are: “Only if severe complications arise [in the context of a type 2 patient] is the care shifted to specialised clinics in hospitals. […] these patients have the most expensive care due to costly treatment of for example foot ulcers and renal insufficiency”]; again, they’re sicker and need more comprehensive care. They would need it even if they did not get it in a hospital setting, and there are costs associated with under-treatment as well.

“About 90 % of the children [with diabetes in Sweden] are classified as having Type 1 diabetes based on positive autoantibodies and a few percent receive a diagnosis of “Maturity Onset Diabetes of the Young” (MODY) [39]. Type 2 diabetes among children is very rare in Sweden.”

Lastly, some observations from the final chapter:

“The paradox that we are dealing with is that in spite of health professionals wanting the best for their patients on a patient by patient basis, the way that individuals and institutions are organised and paid, directly influences the clinical decisions that are made. […] Naturally, optimising personal care and the provider/purchaser-commissioner budget may be aligned, but this is where diabetes poses substantial problems from a health system point of view: The majority of adverse diabetes outcomes […] are many years in the future, so a system based on this year’s budget will often not prioritise the future […] Even for these adverse “diabetes” outcomes, other clinical factors contribute to the end result. […]  attribution to diabetes may not be so obvious to those seeking ways to minimise expenditure.”

[I incidentally tried to get this point across in a recent discussion on SSC, but I’m not actually sure the point was understood, presumably because I did not explain it sufficiently clearly or go into enough detail. It is my general impression, on a related note, that many people who would like to cut down on the sort of implicit public subsidization of unhealthy behaviours that most developed economies to some extent engage in these days do not understand well enough the sort of problems that e.g. the various attribution problems and how to optimize ‘post-diagnosis care’ (even if what you want to optimize is the cost minimization function…) cause in specific contexts. As I hope my comments indicate in that thread, I don’t think these sorts of issues can be ignored or dealt with in some very simple manner – and I’m tempted to say that if you think they can, you don’t know enough about these topics. I say that as one of those people who would like people who engage in risky behaviours to pay a larger (health) risk premium than they currently do].

[Continued from above, …problems from a health system point of view:]
“Payment for ambulatory diabetes care , which is essentially the preventative part of diabetes care, usually sits in a different budget to the inpatient budget where the big expenses are. […] good evidence for reducing hospitalisation through diabetes integrated care is limited […] There is ample evidence [11, 12] where clinicians own, and profit from, other services (e.g., laboratory, radiology), that referral rates are increased, often inappropriately […] Under the English NHS, the converse exists, where GPs, either holding health budgets, or receiving payments for maintaining health budgets [13], reduce their referrals to more specialist care. While this may be appropriate in many cases, it may result in delays and avoidance of referrals, even when specialist care is likely to be of benefit. [this would be the under-treatment I was talking about above…] […] There is a mantra that fragmentation of care and reductions in continuity of care are likely to harm the quality of care [14], but hard evidence is difficult to obtain.”

“The problems outlined above, suggest that any health system that fails to take account of the need to integrate the payment system from both an immediate and long term perspective, must be at greater risk of their diabetes integration attempts failing and/or being unsustainable. […] There are clearly a number of common factors and several that differ between successful and less successful models. […] Success in these models is usually described in terms of hospitalisation (including, e.g., DKA, amputation, cardiovascular disease events, hypoglycaemia, eye disease, renal disease, all cause), metabolic outcomes (e.g., HbA1c ), health costs and access to complex care. Some have described patient related outcomes, quality of life and other staff satisfaction, but the methodology and biases have often not been open to scrutiny. There are some methodological issues that suggest that many of those with positive results may be illusory and reflect the pre-existing landscape and/or wider changes, particular to that locality. […] The reported “success” of intermediate diabetes clinics run by English General Practitioners with a Special Interest led to extension of the model to other areas. This was finally tested in a randomised controlled trial […] and shown to be a more costly model with no real benefit for patients or the system. Similarly in East Cambs and Fenland, the 1 year results suggested major reductions in hospitalisation and costs in practices participating fully in the integrated care initiative, compared with those who “engaged” later [9]. However, once the trends in neighbouring areas and among those without diabetes were accounted for, it became clear that the benefits originally reported were actually due to wider hospitalisation reductions, not just in those with diabetes. Studies of hospitalisation /hospital costs that do not compare with rates in the non-diabetic population need to be interpreted with caution.”

“Kaiser Permanente is often described as a great diabetes success story in the USA due to its higher than peer levels of, e.g., HbA1c testing [23]. However, in the 2015 HEDIS data, levels of testing, metabolic control achieved and complication rates show quality metrics lower than the English NHS, in spite of the problems with the latter [23]. Furthermore, HbA1c rates above 9 % remain at approximately 20 %, in Southern California [24] or 19 % in Northern California [25], a level much higher than that in the UK […] Similarly, the Super Six model […] has been lauded as a success, as a result of reductions in patients with, e.g., amputations. However, these complications were in the bottom quartile of performance for these outcomes in England [26] and hence improvement would be expected with the additional diabetes resources invested into the area. Amputation rates remain higher than the national average […] Studies showing improvement from a low baseline do not necessarily provide a best practice model, but perhaps a change from a system that required improvement. […] Several projects report improvements in HbA1c […] improvements in HbA1c, without reports of hypoglycaemia rates and weight gain, may be associated with worse outcomes as suggested from the ACCORD trial [28].”


December 18, 2016 - Posted by | Books, Diabetes, Economics, Epidemiology, Medicine

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