Econstudentlog

The Second World War (II)

Here’s my first post about Churchill’s book(s). In this post I’ll add some further observations and data; I’m roughly two-thirds through the book(s) at this point.

“a significant proportion of our whole war effort had to be devoted to combating the mine. A vast output of material and money was diverted from other tasks, and many thousands of men risked their lives night and day in the minesweepers alone. The peak figure was reached in June 1944, when nearly sixty thousand were thus employed.”

“On January 10, 1940, anxieties about the Western Front received confirmation. A German staff major of the 7th Air Division had been ordered to take some documents to headquarters in Cologne. He missed his train and decided to fly. His machine overshot the mark and made a forced landing in Belgium, where Belgian troops arrested him and impounded his papers, which he tried desperately to destroy. These contained the entire and actual scheme for the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and France on which Hitler had resolved. […] I was told about all this at the time […] It was argued in all three countries concerned that probably it was a plant. But this could not be true. There could be no sense in the Germans trying to make the Belgians believe that they were going to attack them in the near future. This might make them do the very last thing the Germans wanted, namely, make a plan with the French and British Armies […] I therefore believed in the impending attack. We appealed to Belgium, but the Belgian King and his Army staff merely waited, hoping that all would turn out well. […] no further action of any kind was taken by the Allies or the threatened States. […] Hitler, […] ordered, after venting his anger, new variants [of the invasion plans] to be prepared.”

“until July 1944 Britain and her Empire had a substantially larger number of divisions in contact with the enemy than the United States. This general figure includes not only the European and African spheres but also all the war in Asia against Japan. […] Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyed in the European theatre, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces […] of shipping losses by enemy action suffered by all nations throughout the war […] 80 per cent. were suffered in the Atlantic Ocean, including British coastal waters and the North Sea. Only 5 per cent. were lost in the Pacific. […] Up till the end of 1943 the British discharge of bombs upon Germany had in the aggregate exceeded by eight tons to one those cast from American machines”

“My relations with the President [Roosevelt – US] gradually became so close that the chief business between our two countries was virtually conducted by […] personal interchanges between him and me. […] In all I sent him nine hundred and fifty messages, and received about eight hundred in reply.”

“Altogether there came to the rescue of the Army under the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy about eight hundred and sixty vessels […] at 2.23 p.m. on June 4 the Admiralty, in agreement with the French, announced that Operation “Dynamo” was now completed. More than 338,000 British and Allied troops had been landed in England. […] On June 17 it was announced that the Pétain Government had asked for an armistice, ordering all French forces to cease fighting, without even communicating this information to our troops. General Brooke was consequently told to come away with all men he could embark and any equipment he could save. We repeated now on a considerable scale, though with larger vessels, the Dunkirk evacuation. Over twenty thousand Polish troops who refused to capitulate cut their way to the sea and were carried by our ships to Britain. […] In all there were evacuated from all French harbours 136,000 British troops and 310 guns; a total, with the Poles, of 156,000 men.”

“Hitler and Stalin had much in common as totalitarians, and their systems of government were akin. […] On June 14, the day Paris fell, Moscow sent an ultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other Baltic States of military conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. and demanding radical changes of government and military concessions. On June 15 Red Army troops invaded the country. Latvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatment. […] A Russian ultimatum to Roumania was delivered to the Roumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 p.m. on June 26. The cession of Bessarabia and the norther part of the province of Bukovina was demanded […] On June 27 Roumanian troops were withdrawn from the two provinces concerned, and the territories passed into Russian hands. […] On August 3-6 the pretence of pro-Soviet friendly and democratic Governments [in the Baltic] was swept away, and the Kremlin annexed the Baltic States to the Soviet Union.”

“From September 7 to November 3 an average of two hundred German bombers attacked London every night. […] The night raids were accompanied by more or less continuous daylight attacks by small groups or even single enemy planes, and the sirens often sounded at brief intervals throughout the whole twenty-four hours. To this curious existence the seven million inhabitants of London accustomed themselves. […] We did not know how long it would last. We had no reason to suppose that it would not go on getting worse. […] In the twelve months from June 1940 to June 1941 our civilian casualties were 43,381 killed and 40,856 seriously injured, a total of 94,237.”

“The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril. […] we poised and pondered together on this problem. It did not take the form of flaring battles and glittering achievements. It manifested itself through statistics, diagrams, and curves unknown to the nation, incomprehensible to the public. […] At the outset the Admiralty naturally thought first of bringing the ships safely to port, and judged their success by a minimum of sinkings. But now this was no longer the test. We all realised that the life and war effort of the country depended equally upon the weight of imports safely landed. In the week ending June 8, during the height of the battle in France, we had brought into the country about a million and a quarter tons of cargo, exclusive of oil. From this peak figure imports had declined at the end of July to less than 750,000 tons a week. […] I became increasingly concerned about this ominous fall in imports. “I see,” I minuted to the First Lord in the middle of February, 1941, “that entrances of ships with cargo in January were less than half of what they were last January.” The very magnitude and refinement of our protective measures – convoy, diversion, degaussing [a method employed to counteract magnetic mines – US], mine-clearance, the avoidance of the Mediterranean – the lengthening of most voyages in time and distance and the delays at the ports through bombing and the black-out, all reduced the operative fertility of our shipping to an extent even more serious than the actual losses. […] To the U-boat scourge was soon added air attack far out on the ocean by long-range aircraft. […] Powerful German cruisers were active. […] formidable vessels compelled the employment on convoy duty of nearly every available British capital ship. At one period the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet had only one battleship in hand.”

“In the three months ending with May [1941] U-boats alone sank 142 ships, of 818,000 tons, of which 99 were British. […] in the same three months of March, April, and May 179 ships, of 545,000 tons, were sunk by air attack, mainly in the coastal regions. […] In the Atlantic [1942] proved the toughest [year] of the whole war. […] By the end of January [1942] thirty-one ships, of nearly 200,000 tons, had been sunk off the coast off the United States and Canadian coast. […] In February they destroyed seventy-one ships, of 384,000 tons, in the Atlantic, of which all but two were sunk in the American zone. […] The American Army Air Force, which controlled almost all military shore-based aircraft, had no training in anti-submarine warfare, whereas the Navy, equipped with float-planes and amphibians, had no means to carry it out, and in these crucial months an effective American defence system was only achieved with painful, halting steps. […] It was not until the end of the year that a complete interlocking convoy system covering all [the] immense areas [involved] became fully effective. […] In seven months the Allied losses in the Atlantic from U-boats alone amounted to over three million tons, which included 181 British ships of 1,130,000 tons. Less than one-tenth occurred in convoys. All this cost the enemy up to July no more than fourteen U-boats sunk throughout the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, and of these kills only six were in North American waters. […] during [August] U-boats sank 108 vessels […] Between January and October 1942 the number of U-boats had more than doubled. 196 were operational […] All our escorts had to be cut to the bone for the sake of our main operations in Africa, and in November our losses at sea were the heaviest of the whole war, including 117 ships, of over 700,000 tons, by U-boats alone, another 100,000 from other causes.”

April 19, 2016 - Posted by | books, history

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