i. “Almost every wise saying has an opposite one, no less wise, to balance it.” (George Santayana)
ii. “The truth is cruel, but it can be loved, and it makes free those who have loved it.” (-ll-)
iii. “[I]t is a great advantage to be intelligent and not to look it.” (Agatha Christie, Partners in Crime)
iv. “He claimed that there was no greater natural advantage in life than having an enemy overestimating your faults, unless it was to have a friend underestimate your virtues.” (Mario Puzo, The Godfather)
v. “That is the saving grace of humor, if you fail no one is laughing at you.” (A. Whitney Brown)
vi. “We may forgive those who bore us, we cannot forgive those whom we bore.” (Rochefoucauld)
vii. “A wise man changes his mind sometimes, but a fool never. To change your mind is the best evidence you have one.” (Desmond Ford)
viii. “No man was ever wise by chance.” (Nulli sapere casu obtigit. Seneca the Younger)
ix. “National unity is the basis of national security.” (Felix Frankfurter)
x. “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” (-ll-)
xi. “The most constructive way of resolving conflicts is to avoid them.” (-ll-)
xii. “Some men never spake a wise word, yet doe wisely; some on the other side doe never a wise deed, and yet speake wisely.” (Sir Thomas Overbury)
xiii. “One of the most interesting features of the open borders project is that it makes war obsolete by virtue of automatic surrender. Who needs tanks and rifles when your people can just walk across the border unarmed?” (‘Outis‘)
xiv. “War most often promotes the internal unity of each state involved. The state plagued by internal strife may then, instead of waiting for the accidental attack, seek the war that will bring internal peace.” (Kenneth Waltz)
xv. “War may achieve a redistribution of resources, but labor, not war, creates wealth.” (-ll-)
xvi. “Nerds do not think they are better than you. Nerds are better than you, in their particular fields, unless you happen to be an even more devoted nerd.” (Laura Penny)
xvii. “Posthumous fame, book fame, nerd fame is not like the good kind of fame. It might last for centuries and let antique egg heads torture the young from the grave, but it just doesn’t pay the bills.” (-ll-)
xviii. “Pedantry and mastery are opposite attitudes toward rules. To apply a rule to the letter, rigidly, unquestioningly, in cases where it fits and in cases where it does not fit, is pedantry. … To apply a rule with natural ease, with judgment, noticing the cases where it fits, and without ever letting the words of the rule obscure the purpose of the action or the opportunities of the situation, is mastery.” (George Pólya)
xix. “If you cannot solve the proposed problem, try to solve first a simpler related problem.” (-ll-)
xx. “Simplicity is worth buying if we do not have to pay too great a loss of precision for it.” (-ll-)
“The purpose of the book is to bring together a number of nonverbal behavior researchers to discuss current themes and research. The book is meant for senior undergraduates, graduates, academics and nonverbal communication researchers, as well as for everyone else who wants to interpret and understand better nonverbal behavior and the states of their interlocutors. The texts in this book show the results of contemporary research and theorization of the nature, functions, and modalities of nonverbal behavior in different areas of life.”
From the introduction of the book. The book has two parts; a theoretical part and an applied part. The first half of the book covers theoretical research and as I also noted in my goodreads review I found this part of the book quite weak, but a few of the chapters in the second half of the book, dealing with applied research into these topics, had some interesting stuff (‘If you decide to have a go at this book I’d probably be tempted to recommend only reading the first four chapters of part 2’ – from my goodreads review). My coverage of the book in this post will skip a lot of chapters; I’ll focus on the stuff I found interesting and just ignore the rest. The four chapters mentioned above cover ‘Nonverbal Firsts: When Nonverbal Cues Are the Impetus of Relational and Personal Change in Romantic Relationships’ (chapter 7), ‘Beyond Facial Expression: Spatial Distance as a Factor in the Communication of Discrete Emotions’ (chapter 8), Theoretical Foundation for Emotion-Based Strategies in Political Campaigns (chapter 9), and ‘The Impact of Nonverbal Behavior in the Job Interview’ (chapter 10).
I would note that I actually emailed a few quotes from the last of these chapters to a good friend of mine who recently had a job interview coming up, which is perhaps a good illustration of how potentially useful I consider some of the content covered here to be – this is worth keeping in mind when interpreting the two star (and ‘much closer to one star than three’) goodreads rating. It should however also be recalled that the authors of chapter 8, which is incidentally far from the worst chapter in the book, claim/think the so-called McClintock effect is real, based on outdated research. They write in the chapter that: “Martha McClintock and colleagues reported evidence that the menstrual cycles of co-habiting women can become synchronized, a phenomenon termed the McClintock effect (McClintock, 1971; Hummer & McClintock, 2009). Although controversial, the reality of the phenomenon is now generally accepted (Wysocki & Preti, 2004).” Compare with wikipedia: “A 2013 review of menstrual synchrony concluded that menstrual synchrony is an erroneous theory. […] Harris and Vitzthum concluded, “In light of the lack of empirical evidence for MS [menstrual synchrony] sensu stricto, it seems there should be more widespread doubt than acceptance of this hypothesis””.
Below I have added some quotes from the book, as well as a few observations of my own. I would note that I have read and written about stuff related to the content covered in this post before here on the blog, so if you’re curious to learn more after having read this post, you might consider following some of those links.
“[N]onverbal behaviors have the potential to be transformative. That is, they may act as triggers for a change in a relationship, perception, behavior, or affect. In particular, […] when a nonverbal behavior occurs or is noticed for the first time, these behavioral “firsts” can have big implications, positive or negative, for people in relationships. […] the authors find that touch, eye behavior, and personal space are the cues reported most commonly as triggers for change and which help bring about the start of a romantic relationship, perception of how much or little another cares, relational problems, instant break-ups, and indicators of another’s untrustworthiness.”
“Baxter and Bullis (1986) found that the first time their participants kissed or had sex with a partner altered the degree of commitment that they had to the relationship. In this way, the first appearance of certain nonverbal cues or acts may be important triggers of change within a relationship. […] In our respondents’ reports, we read many accounts of how a single behavior, used for what the respondent recalled was the first time, instantly changed the relationship or the perception of the relationship between the two individuals. There was some variety in the behaviors, but most typically they were handholding, prolonged gaze, kisses, closer proximity, and “changes” in touch behavior. In most of the situations described by our participants, the behavior was received positively and started a romantic relationship. In a few instances, however, it indicated to the respondent that they or another person had romantic feelings that were unreciprocated. These latter situations reportedly resulted in either the termination of the existing relationship or awkwardness in the relationship. […] the same actions – kisses, close personal distance – may have very different outcomes, depending on the reciprocity of the behaviors and feelings. […] a rather common claim about touch is that it “is a signal in the communication process that, above all other communication channels, most directly and immediately escalates the balance of intimacy” […]. Perhaps above all other nonverbal cues, touch has been shown to facilitate dramatic “surge[s] in affective involvement” […] nonverbal cues, although sometimes subtle and easy to miss, may actually be “big” actions in relational change.”
“[P]articipants often commented on the lack of a behavior (e.g., no eye contact, ignoring behavior [which presumably was determined by lack of gaze, not responding, and the like], and not talking [silence]). The themes were consistent whether they were discussing their own or their partner’s behaviors. […] Avoidance of eye contact, silence, and “ignoring,” rather than immediate, engaged, intimate, behavior was common in this group of entries and marked the beginning (or the first signal) of the relationship’s decline.”
The research they presented in the chapter was disappointing to me in a way, due to the methodology applied. Basically they asked people (…well, psychology undergrads…) which non-verbal behaviours ‘stood out’ to them, and then they interpreted the behaviours based on these accounts. Recall biases are a potentially serious problem, and if you ask people to explain relationship changes as a function of nonverbal behaviours then you’ll probably get answers indicating that nonverbal behaviours are important, regardless of whether they really are or not. But on a related note it seems hard to do ‘naturalistic/observational’ research into these topics (‘follow people around with video cameras and try to spot which nonverbal behaviours on display might be associated with relationship formation?’), and even if the self-reports are not wholly reliable they may provide some information. A big problem in the context of research into these things is of course that you can’t really directly observe relationships and relationship formation; these things are to a very large extent nothing but mental constructs in the minds of the people involved, meaning that you probably to some extent sort of have to rely on things like self-report variables. This makes everything quite a bit more ‘fuzzy’ than it otherwise would be. Note that the fact that ‘relationships are mental constructs existing only in the minds of the people involved’ does not to me seem to necessarily indicate that asking people what they think caused a relationship to change will yield reliable answers; people may not know why they feel the way they do about a given individual or why their feelings changed at some point, and/but if you give them a specific reason/variable to consider they’ll be likely to overestimate the importance of said variable. If they’d asked the same people if specific verbal exchanges (‘first time he said ‘I love you’?’) had changed how they felt about that individual, they might have got different answers.
When you consider how ‘squishy’ this stuff is, I think other approaches besides the ones considered by the authors might also be useful to consider if you want to get at the extent to which nonverbal behaviour is important; for example I feel tempted to conclude that the poor relationship outcomes of autistics (“In terms of outcome studies to date, very few adults with ASD have been reported to have successful, long-term romantic relationships […] Between 10 and 30 % of adults in recent studies […] had experience in a romantic relationship.” – link), a population including people who often have great difficulties interpreting nonverbal behaviours and cues, might provide stronger evidence in favour of the importance of nonverbal behaviours in relationship contexts than the study in question provides. Although I’d certainly agree that important confounders are present in this context (…as well), making it very difficult to take the poor relationship outcomes of this group as solely a consequence of nonverbal behavioural aspects.
“[In political contexts,] candidates and issues that emphasize freedom (e.g., fewer restrictions and external constraints on behavior and opportunities, less limitation on social and economic mobility) are more likely to appeal to men than to women. […] political messages or tactics that repeatedly produce anxious feelings (e.g., bewilderment, distress, pain, insecurity, fear) in voters are likely to magnify the influence of voter emotions on voter political judgments. Additional related effects are expected to include greater polarization of competing groups and simplification of decision rules and belief systems (e.g., increased single-issue voting, greater reliance on candidates’ physical features and communication styles than on candidates’ ideological positions).”
“Research shows that there is a positive relation between [job] applicant positive nonverbal behavior and recruiter evaluation. Positive nonverbal behavior can be defined as immediacy behavior which elicits proximity and liking in the interaction partner as for example a high level of eye contact, smiling, confirmative nodding, hand gestures, and variation in pitch and speaking rate […]. Applicants who used more immediacy behavior (i.e., eye contact, smiling, body orientation toward interviewer, less personal distance) were perceived as being more suitable for the job, more competent, more motivated, and more successful than applicants using less immediacy behavior […] Forbes and Jackson (1980) showed that selected applicants maintained more direct eye contact, smiled more, and nodded more during the job interview than applicants who were not selected for the job. Moreover, applicants who maintained a high amount of eye contact with the recruiter, who showed a high energy level, were affective, modulated their voice, and spoke fluently during the job interview were more likely to be invited for a second job interview than applicants revealing less of those nonverbal behaviors”.
“In terms of applicant characteristics, applicants high in communication apprehension who used more nonverbal avoidance behavior (i.e., less talking, less eye contact, less fluent talking) were less effective in mock job interviews and were perceived as less suitable for the job than applicants with low levels of communication apprehension […] Overall, there are only few studies that did not show an effect between applicant nonverbal immediacy behavior and a favorable hiring decision […] and meta-analyses reveal a clear net effect showing that the more the applicant uses nonverbal immediacy behavior, the better the interview outcome for the applicant (i.e., better chances of getting hired or of being evaluated positively) […] Applicant nonverbal behavior seems to have a remarkable impact on the job interview outcome. The more immediacy (or positive) nonverbal behavior the applicant shows during the job interview, the more positive recruiter evaluations of the applicant are.”
“the question can be asked how accurate recruiters are when inferring applicant characteristics. For many personality characteristics, they seem to use the “wrong,” meaning non-diagnostic, cues. […] many more nonverbal cues are used to infer applicant’s personality traits than are cues actually revealing these traits. […] recruiters seem to use the nonverbal cues that are not diagnostic to assess applicants – in a sense they use the wrong cues – and [yet] are still accurate in assessing applicants’ personality. It remains therefore largely unknown how the recruiters make those correct inferences.”
How accurate the inferences are is to some extent an open question (though it’s probably safe to say that interviews provide less relevant information than many people think – including the authors of that chapter: “[interviews] provide very little unique information about a candidate and show little incremental validity over established psychometric tests (of ability and personality) in the prediction of future job performance […] All sorts of extraneous factors like the perfume a person wears at interview have been shown to influence ratings.” – link). A related observation is that assessment accuracy definitely depends upon the dimension of the variable of interest; some personality characteristics are much easier to observe/deduce than are others, as noted e.g. in Funder’s (‘some behaviors are more dependent on the situation than are others’) book (‘traits like extraversion and agreeableness are the ones most likely to become visible in overt social behavior’).
“Put very crudely, the main thesis of this book is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. […] Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as (1) Prisoner’s Dilemma-type situations; (2) Co-ordination situations; (3) Inequality (or Partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problem.”
I should probably before moving on apologize for the infrequent updates – you should expect blogging to be light also in the months to come. With that out of the way, the book to which the title of this post refers and from which the above quote is taken is this Oxford University Press publication. Here’s what I wrote about the book on goodreads:
“The last chapter wasn’t in my opinion nearly as good as the others, presumably in part because I was unfamiliar with a lot of the literature to which she referred, but also because I could not really agree with all the distinctions and arguments made, and I was close to giving the book 3 stars as a result of this [I gave the book 4 stars on goodreads]. I think she overplays the ‘impersonal’ nature of norms in that chapter; if a norm based on sanctions is not enforced then it is irrelevant, and to the extent that it is enforced *someone* needs to impose the sanction on the transgressor. The fact that it’s actually in some contexts considered ‘a problem that needs explaining’ to figure out exactly how to support a model with sanctioning in a context where enforcement is costly to the individual (it’s a problem because of the free-riding issue – it’s always easier to let someone else do the sanctioning…) seems to have eluded Margalit (for details on this topic, see e.g. Boyd and Richerson).
It’s probably helpful to be familiar with basic game theoretic concepts if you’re planning on reading this book (it has a lot of game theory, though most of it is quite simple stuff), as well as perhaps having some familiarity with basic economics (rationality assumptions, utility functions, etc.) but I’m not sure it’s strictly necessary – I think the author does cover most of the basic things you need to know to be able to follow the arguments. The first three chapters are quite good.”
I should point out here that when I was writing the review above I had been completely unaware of how long ago the book was written; the book is pretty self-contained and I hadn’t really noticed when I picked up the book that it’s actually a rather old book. If I had been aware of this I would not have been nearly as vocal in my criticism of the content of the last chapter in my review as was the case, given that some of the insights I blame the author for being unaware of were only discussed in the literature after the publication of this book; the unaddressed problems do remain unaddressed and they are problematic, but it’s probably unfair to blame the author for not thinking about stuff which probably nobody really had given any thought at the time of publication.
In the post below I’ll talk a little bit about the book and add some more quotes. It probably makes sense to start out by giving a brief outline of the problems encountered in the three settings mentioned above. The basic problem encountered in prisoner’s dilemma-type situations is that unilateral defection is an attractive proposition, but if everybody yields to this temptation and defect then that will lead to a bad outcome. The problem faced is thus to figure out some way to make sure that defection is not an attractive option. In the co-ordination setting, there are several mutually beneficial states, none of which are strictly preferred to the others; that is, there is a coincidence of interests among the parties involved. The problem is that it’s difficult to come to an an explicit agreement as to which of the states to aim for. An example could be whether to drive in the right side of the road or the left side of the road. It probably doesn’t really matter much which side of the road you’re driving on, as long as you’re driving in the same side of the road as the other drivers do. The coincidence of interests here need not be perfect; one person might slightly prefer to drive in the right side of the road, all else equal, but even so it’ll be in his or her interest to drive in the same side of the road as do the other drivers; there’s no incentive for unilateral defection, and the main problem is figuring out how to achieve the outcome where behaviour is coordinated so that one of the available equilibria is reached. In the third setting, there’s some inequality present and one party is at an advantage; the problem here is how to maintain this advantageous position and how to fortify it so that it’s stable.
Some quotes and a few more comments:
“[One] angle from which it may be illuminating to view the account of norms offered here is that of evolutionary explanations. […] I propose to regard the argument underlying this book as, in a borrowed and somewhat metaphorical sense, a natural selection theory of the development of norms.”
“Norms do not as a rule come into existence at a definite point in time, nor are they the result of a manageable number of identifiable acts. The are, rather, the resultant of complex patterns of behaviour of a large number of people over a protracted period of time.”
“it is proposed that the main elements in the characterization of norms of obligation be: a significant social pressure for conformity to them and against deviation – actual or potential – from them; the belief by the people concerned in their indispensability for the proper functioning of society; and the expected clashes between their dictates on the one hand and personal interests and desires on the other.”
It should be noted here that far from all norms qualify as norms of obligation; this is but one norm subgroup, though it’s an important one. The author notes explicitly that norms encountered in the context of coordination problems are not norms of obligation.
“A situation of the generalized PD variety poses a problem to the participants involved. The problem is that of protecting an unstable yet jointly beneficial state of affairs from deteriorating, so to speak, into a stable yet jointly destructive one. My contention concerning such a situation is that a norm, backed by appropriate sanctions, could solve this problem. In this sense it can be said that such situations ‘call for’ norms. It can further be said that a norm solving the problem inherent in a situation of this type is generated by it. Such norms I shall call PD norms. […] the smaller and the more determinate the class of participants in a generalized PD-structured situation, and the more isolated the occurrence of the dilemma among them, the more likely it is that there might be solutions other than (PD) norms to the pertinent problem […] And conversely, the larger and the more indeterminate the class of participants, and the more frequent the occurrence of the dilemma among them, the more likely it is that a solution, if any, would be in the form of a PD norm. […] the more difficult (or costly) it is to ensure […] personal contact, […] the more acute the need for some impersonal device, such as social norms, which would induce the desired co-operation.”
You can easily add more details to the conceptual framework underlying the analysis in order to refine it in various ways, and the author does talk a little bit about how you might go about doing that; for example it might not be realistic that nobody ever deviates, and so you might decide to replace an unrealistic stability condition that nobody deviates with another one which might be that at most some percentage, say X, of the population deviates. Such refined theoretical models can incidentally yield very interesting and non-trivial theoretical results – Boyd and Richerson cover such models in The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. It should perhaps be noted that even relatively simple models dealing with these sorts of topics may easily end up nevertheless being sufficiently complicated for analytical solutions to not be forthcoming.
“there are norms whose function is to maintain social control on certain groups of people through preventing them from solving the problem inherent in the PD-structured situation in which they are placed. That is, these norms are designed to help keep these people in a state of affairs which, while disadvantageous to them […] is considered beneficial to society as a whole. A conspicuous example of norms of this type are anti-trust laws.”
In the context of coordination problems, the author distinguishes between two solution mechanisms/norms; conventions and decrees. Broadly speaking conventions can be thought of as established solutions to coordination problems encountered in the past, whereas decrees are solutions to novel problems where no equilibrium has yet been established – see also the more detailed quotes below. In the context of sanctions an important difference between coordination norms and PD norms is that sanctions can be said to play a primary role in the context of PD norms but only a secondary role in the context of coordination norms; nobody has a unilateral incentive to deviate in the context of coordination-type situations/problems and so defection so to speak carries its own punishment independent of the potential level of an associated sanction. If everybody else drive in the right side of the road, you don’t gain anything from driving in the left side of the road – and it’s unlikely to be the size of the fine which is the primary reason why you don’t drive in the left side of the road in such a context.
“It is worth noting that within the large class of problems of strategy (i.e. problems of interdependent decision), the problems of co-ordination stand in opposition to problems of conflict, the contrast being particularly acute between the extreme cases of pure co-ordination on the one hand and of pure conflict (the so-called zero-sum problems) on the other. Whereas in the pure co-ordination case the parties’ interests converge completely, and the agents win or lose together, in the pure conflict case the parties’ interests diverge completely, and one person’s gain is the other’s loss. […] [Shelling argues] that games of strategy range over a continuum with games of pure conflict […] and games of pure co-ordination as opposite limits. All other games […] involve mixtures in varying proportions of conflict and co-ordination, of competition and partnership, and are referred to as mixed-motive games.”
One thing to add here, which is of course not mentioned in the book, is that whereas the situation does play a sometimes major role in terms of which setting you find yourself in, there’s also a relevant mental/psychological aspect to consider here; in the context of bargaining, it’s a very well-established result that bargainers who conceive of the bargaining situation as a zero-sum (‘conflict’) game do worse than bargainers who do not.
“Very generally, where communities which have their own ways of going about things – their own arrangements, regularities, conventions – come into contact, and where the situation demands that barriers between them be dropped, or that one – any one – of them absorb the other, various co-ordination problems are likely to crop up and to call for […] decree-type co-ordination norms to solve them.”
“Conventions are, typically:
(1) Non-statutory norms, which need not be enacted, formulated, or promulgated.
(2) They are neither issued nor promulgated by any identifiable authority, and are hence what is usually called impersonal, or anonymous norms.
(3) They involve in the main non-institutionalized, non-organized, and informal sanctions (i.e. punishments or rewards).
Decrees, in contrast, are, typically:
(2) Issued and promulgated by some appropriately endowed authority (not necessarily at the level of the state);
(3) The sanctions they involve might be organized, institutionalized, and formal, even physical.”
Conventions and decrees are quite different, but in terms of what they do they solve similar problems:
“Since a co-ordination problem is a situation such that any of its co-ordination equilibria is preferred, by all involved, to any combination of actions which is not a co-ordination equlibrium, each of those involved is interested in there being something which will point – in a way conspicuous to all and perceived to be conspicuous to all – to one particular co-ordination equilibrum as the solution. This precisely is what our co-ordination norms, whether conventions or decrees, do.”
“Thibaut and Kelley note that norms ‘will develop more rapidly and more surely in highly cohesive groups than in less cohesive groups’ – assuming that the majority of the members have about the same degree of dependence on the group […] To the extent that norms reduce interference, cut communication costs, heighten value similarity and insure the interaction sequence necessary for task performance, norms improve the reward-cost positions attained by the members of a dyad and thus increase the cohesiveness of the dyad”
“[I]n so far as conformity to a co-ordination norm ensures the achievement of some co-ordination equilibrium, which for everyone involved in the corresponding co-ordination problem belongs of necessity to the group of preferred outcomes, it is rational for everyone to conform to it. Are we to conclude from this, however, that the social choice to which the co-ordination norm is instrumental is itself rational? My answer to this question is that although it is rational to conform to a prevailing co-ordination norm, the social choice resulting from it is not necessarily rational. […] it may not be optimal, for some or for all involved. It can in principle be changed into a better one, only this involves an explicit process which is not always feasible. […] The changing of an existing convention in favour of a ‘better’, more rational one, has to be explicit. It can be achieved through an explicit agreement of all concerned, or through a regulation (decree) issued and properly promulgated by some appropriately endowed authority. Where communication, or promulgation, is impossible, it is difficult to see how an existing convention (which is a co-ordination norm) might be changed. It is of some interest to note that whereas an ‘act of convening’ is not necessary for a convention to form, it might be necessary for an existing convention to be exchanged for an alternative one.”
“The difference in the role played by the two types of norms might now be formulated thus: a co-ordination norm helps those involved ‘meet’ each other; a PD norm helps those involved protect themselves from damaging, even ruining, each other.”
“[T]here are states of inequality which appear on the surface to be stable but which are, in a somewhat subtle and complicated way, strategically unstable. They may be in equilibrium, but it is a rather flimsy one; far from being self-perpetuating, they are susceptible to threats. Now the assumption that the party discriminated in favour of is interested in the preservation of such a status quo leads reasonably to the assumption that he will seek to fortify it against its potential undermining. […] it is the central thesis of this chapter that [a] significant device to render the status quo stable [is] to fortify it by norms. The idea is that once it is in some sense normatively required that the status quo endure, the nature of the possible calculations and considerations of deviance fundamentally changes: it is no longer evaluated only in terms of being ‘costly’ or ‘risky’, but as being ‘wrong‘ or ‘subversive‘. […] the methods of norms and force as possible fortifiers of the status quo in question are functionally equivalent […] provided the norms are effective, they both amount to making deviance from the status quo more costly through the impositions of sanctions.”
“Once norms are internalized, one abides by them not out of fear of the pending sanctions associated with them, but out of some inner conviction. And when this is so, one is likely to conform to the norms even in one’s thoughts, intentions, and in what one does in private.”
“The function of norms, generally speaking, is to put restraints on possible courses of conduct, to restrict the number of alternatives open for action. When a certain course of conduct is normatively denounced (is considered ‘wrong’), it becomes a less eligible course of conduct than it might otherwise have been: although through lying, for example, one might quite conveniently get away with some misdeed, its being recognized and acknowledged as normatively (morally) prohibited normally makes it a less attractive way out, or even precludes its having been considered an alternative in the first place. In this sense, then, norms might be said to be coercive, to the extent that they function as constraints on actions; that is, to the extent that they prevent one for doing an ation one might have done had there been no norm denouncing it, or at least to the extent that they render a certain course of action less eligible than it might otherwise have been.”
“[N]orms are rather easily accepted as part of the ‘natural order of things’. To be sure, one might be quite resentful of this natural order, or of one’s lot therein, and regard it as discriminating against one. But usually there is very little one is going to do about it unless – and until – the object of one’s resentment is personified: only few will start a revolution against an elusive oppressive ‘system’; many more might revolt against an identifiable oppressive ruler. […] These norms have to apply to the privileged as well as to the deprived, or else they lose much of their effectiveness as a disguise for the real exercise of power underlying them. […] The absence of any precedents in which someone privileged was spared the sanction, the absence of any loopholes which might facilitate a discriminatory application of the norms, contribute to their deterrence value”.
The sound quality of this lecture is not completely optimal – there’s a recurring echo popping up now and then which I found slightly annoying – but this should not keep you from watching the lecture. It’s a quite good lecture, and very accessible – I don’t really think you even need to know anything about genetics to follow most of what he’s talking about here; as far as I can tell it’s a lecture intended for people who don’t really know much about population genetics. He introduces key concepts as they are needed and he does not go much into the technical details which might cause people trouble (this of course also makes the lecture somewhat superficial, but you can’t get everything). If you’re the sort of person who wants details not included in the lecture you’re probably already reading e.g. Razib Khan (who incidentally recently blogged/criticized a not too dissimilar paper from the one discussed in the lecture, dealing with South Asia)…
I must admit that I actually didn’t like this lecture very much, but I figured I might as well include it in this post anyway.
I found some questions included and some aspects of the coverage a bit ‘too basic’ for my taste, but other people interested in chess reading along here may like Anna’s approach better; like Krause’s lecture I think it’s an accessible lecture, despite the fact that it actually covers many lines in quite a bit of detail. It’s a long lecture but I don’t think you necessarily need to watch all of it in one go (…or at all?) – the analysis of the second game, the Kortschnoj-Gheorghiu game, starts around 45 minutes in so that might for example be a good place to include a break, if a break is required.
i. “to esteem every one is to esteem no one. […] the friend of all mankind is no friend of mine.” (Alceste, The Misanthrope, by Molière)
ii. “The art of not reading is a very important one. It consists in not taking an interest in whatever may be engaging the attention of the general public at any particular time. When some political or ecclesiastical pamphlet, or novel, or poem is making a great commotion, you should remember that he who writes for fools always finds a large public. A precondition for reading good books is not reading bad ones: for life is short.” (Schopenhauer)
iii. “people are never like what you remember them. You make them, as the years go by, more and more the way you wish them to be, and as you think you remember them. If you want to remember them as agreeable and gay and handsome, you make them far more so than they actually were.” (Poirot, in Agatha Christie’s Third Girl)
iv. “Youth is a failing only too easily outgrown.” (Agatha Christie, The Secret Adversary)
v. “There are faults which show heart and win hearts, while the virtue in which there is no love, repels.” (John Lancaster Spalding)
vi. “Solitude is unbearable for those who can not bear themselves.” (-ll-)
vii. “If we learn from those only, of whose lives and opinions we altogether approve, we shall have to turn from many of the highest and profoundest minds.” (-ll-)
viii. “The lover of education labors first of all to educate himself.” (-ll-)
ix. “The smaller the company, the larger the conversation.” (-ll-)
x. “What we acquire with joy, we possess with indifference.” (-ll-)
xi. “The innocence which is simply ignorance is not virtue.” (-ll-)
xii. “If our opinions rest upon solid ground, those who attack them do not make us angry, but themselves ridiculous.” (-ll-)
xiii. “(Respect)/(Required math) determines what academic field you should go into. Thus, economics is always a bad choice.” (Zach Weinersmith)
xiv. “there are important information effects of emotion. Emotions provide information about a situation that might be used in reasoning; it alters the way information provided in the reasoning statements is processed; and it influences what additional information may be activated during reasoning. […] emotional states are used strategically to orient reasoning strategies. For instance, sadness might indicate that there is a problem to be solved, and thus that a more careful, analytical mode of reasoning may be indicated. By contrast, positive moods signal that the individual is progressing towards their goals and that there is no urgent problem to solve; habitual, stereotypical ways of reasoning can thus be relied upon. […] anger seems to lead to more heuristic, less systematic processing […]. Similar effects have been observed for positive mood […] inducing positive or negative moods can be effective argumentative strategies to cover up weak arguments.” (Emotion and Reasoning, by Blanchette et al.).
xv. “People vary not only in the emotions they experience, but also in the degree to which they are aware of their own emotions, and emotional awareness influences the impact of emotions on beliefs. […] High emotional awareness has positive consequences when beliefs are adaptive. When the beliefs are maladaptive or destructive (the government is spying on me; I am worthless), high emotional awareness is linked to adverse consequences.” (-ll-)
xvi. “everyone knows they’re going to die, but no one really believes it.” (Spalding Gray)
xvii. “I guess this is why most maps of the solar system aren’t drawn to scale. It’s not hard to draw the planets. It’s the empty space that’s a problem. […] Most space charts leave out the most significant part – all the space.” (If the Moon Were Only 1 Pixel – A tediously accurate map of the solar system)
xviii. “There is no dress which embellishes the body more than science does the mind.” (Laurent Clerc)
xix. “It’s easier to hold to your principles 100% of the time than it is to hold to them 98% of the time.” (Clayton M. Christensen)
xx. “It would be a terrible mistake to go through life thinking that people are the sum total of what you see.” (Jonathan Tropper)