Econstudentlog

Metacognition – Cognitive and Social Dimensions (I)

“Metacognition is a fundamental characteristic of human cognition. Not only do we have cognitive activities but it would seem that they can apply to themselves: we have cognitions about cognition. […] How we answer simple, factual questions involves more complexities than one would expect. We should wonder, for instance, why we keep searching for an answer we do not find immediately, how we know we do not know something […], why we start searching at all […] or what makes us confident in some response we have been able to come up with […]. All the above points are somehow related to metacognition, that is, to the more or less explicit knowledge we have of the way our memory and our mind work. […] The social world requires that we make a staggering number of decisions about the extent and nature of our own knowledge and beliefs as well as decisions about the extent and nature of other people’s knowledge and beliefs. […] Judgments about the trustworthiness of knowledge are just one among many different types of metacognitive judgments. There is virtually no end to the number of cognitive assessments that could be made about the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of the self and others. What does she think, why does she think it, when did she start thinking it, what would get her to stop thinking it? Do I know the answer to your question, when and from whom did I hear the answer, would I have remembered it if I had heard it, what will help me to remember it, and can I be confident that my memory will be accurate? Human action and interaction depend in crucial respects upon our general success in these rough metacognitive waters. […] Because social behavior and metacognition rely on general cognitive processes, metacognition must also rely on approximations, limited capacity processes, arguable heuristics, intrusion of naive theories, and so forth. The interesting question is whether this explains why our judgments about others and ourselves cannot be better and how they go wrong. The various chapters in this book analyze simple cognitive tasks and a number of problematic social situations. The cognitive analysis seems to converge on a small number of principles that may not be completely understood yet but that seem to agree with what has been observed in social cognition.”

This book, from which the above quotes are taken, is not nearly as good as I thought it might be – I was disappointed with the book, which is part of why it got only two stars on goodreads.

I got a Kindle e-reader as a birthday present recently, and I read this book (as well as the habituation book and the Christie novels already mentioned) using that device. It is very hard, bordering on impossible, to highlight stuff when using the Kindle, which means that I’m actually really not a big fan of it. Highlighting and note-taking are very important aspects of reading for me, and when I can’t do those things (or if those things are potentially possible yet prohibitively difficult and time-consuming, as is the case here) reading becomes a very different, and much less enjoyable, experience. Basically I’ve already decided that I’ll only use the device when I have very few relevant alternatives; in general terms I’d say for example that I’d much rather be carrying around a book, two highlighters (yellow and green) and a pen (…stuff I usually carry around with me on occasions where I leave my place and I know that I might have an opportunity to read while I’m away, e.g. in a bus) than this device and nothing else.

I read the book last week, but before writing this post I felt like all I had to show for it were some bookmarks which I added while reading it on the Kindle (bookmarks are much easier to add than are highlights or notes, at least on my device); this was part of why I postponed blogging it and why I didn’t blog it soon after I got back online – I knew I’d have to basically read large parts of the book again in order to blog it, because the key sections to add to a post like this were not separated from the rest of the text the way they usually are when I’m about to blog a book, and given that the book actually isn’t really all that great in the first place it seemed like a lot of work. But here we are.

The book has 12 chapters of varying quality – here’s what the chapters deal with: 1) From Social Cognition to Metacognition, 2) Illusions of Knowing: The Link between Knowledge and Metaknowledge, 3) Rapid Feeling-of-Knowing: A Strategy Selection Mechanism, 4) The Feeling-of-Knowing as a Judgment, 5) Knowing Thyself and Others: Progress in Metacognitive Social Psychology, 6) Social Influence on Memory, 7) Beliefs, Confidence and the Widows Ademoski: On Knowing What We Know about Others, 8) Social Judgeability Concerns in Impression Formation, 9) The Consciousness of Social Beliefs: A Program of Research on Stereotyping and Prejudice, 10) Protecting Our Minds: The Role of Lay Beliefs, 11) The Metacognition of Bias Correction: Naive Theories of Bias and the Flexible Correction Model, and 12) Correction and Metacognition: Are People Naive Dogmatists or Naive Empiricists during Social Judgments?

The book is an interdisciplinary work in the sense that it includes research from both social psychology and cognitive psychology. It’s to some extent already a slightly ‘old book’; it was published in 1998. A lot of stuff has happened since then in related fields, and presumably in this field as well, but it looked like an interesting book so I decided to give it a shot anyway.

I think that I in general liked the second half better than the first half. Below I have covered stuff from the first five chapters of the book.

“Research has shown that human subjects can express a number of more or less valid judgments about various aspects of experimental cognitive tasks […] Research also suggests that these judgments are more or less directly related to the optimization of cognitive processes, determining how long one will search for an answer, keep rehearsing when learning, etc. […] Most cognitive processes are normally accompanied by metacognitive operations that supervise and control various aspects of these processes. Thus, when we make an appointment, we often have to take precautions not to miss it, and these precautions depend on our assessment of their effectiveness as well as on our assessment of the chances of missing the appointment if these precautions are not taken. […] In attempting to retrieve a piece of information from memory, we can often tell whether it is indeed in store and worth searching for, and when we finally do succeed in retrieving the solicited information, we can generally assess the likelihood that it is the correct information. What is important about the subjective feelings that ensue from monitoring operations is that they generally have measurable effects on our behavior […] For example, the stronger my feeling of knowing [FOK] about an elusive name, the more time I am likely to spend searching for it before giving up […] One can conclude from this line of research that the accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments is well above chance yet “far from perfect” […] In addition to prediction of accuracy, feeling-of-knowing has been shown to be correlated with search duration […] when subjects [experience] stronger feelings of knowing, they [search] longer. […] Several researchers exploring the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon have speculated about the underlying mechanisms that are involved in this process. One viewpoint that has received some attention is the trace access hypothesis. This presumes that subjects have partial access to, and are able to monitor some aspects of, the target item during feeling-of-knowing judgments […] An alternative viewpoint to the trace access hypothesis is the cue familiarity hypothesis. This position argues that feeling-of-knowing judgments rely on the familiarity of the cues in the questions themselves”

So which one is right? Here are some relevant comments from chapter two:

“Although subjects are generally successful in monitoring the availability of inaccessible information, this is not because they have privileged access to the underlying memory trace. Rather, the FOK monitors the accessibility of partial information regardless of its correctness, and its accuracy derives from the fact that most of the information that comes to mind is correct. In this sense the accuracy of metamemory can be said to constitute a by-product of the accuracy of memory itself. […] results suggest that the ease with which information comes to mind can serve as a valid cue for the accuracy of that information, and that FOK judgments do in fact monitor ease of access. The reliance on ease of access, then, can also contribute to FOK validity in predicting memory performance. In this manner FOK judgments can function in two capacities, as predictors of the future recognition of the full target (prospective monitoring), and as postdictors of the accuracy of the partial information that has already been accessed (retrospective monitoring). […] The accessibility account of the FOK is […] consistent with findings in social psychology indicating that subjective experiences and social judgments are affected by the fluency with which stimuli are processed, and by the ease with which information comes to mind. These findings too suggest that under some conditions judgments are based on a nonanalytic, inferential process rather than on direct access to the judged attribute, and that people are not always capable of monitoring the validity or relevance of the associations that come to mind”

The authors of chapter 3:

“There is empirical evidence supporting both views [the cue-familiarity hypothesis and the trace access hypothesis]. Thus, one can say that both hypotheses are correct (or wrong). However, we believe that this must be qualified by stating that the accuracy of the hypothesis depends on the methodology one uses to investigate feeling-of-knowing. If the researcher is investigating a feeling-of-knowing process that occurs after a memory retrieval failure, then it is likely that the feeling-of-knowing that is assessed is a by-product of the retrieval attempt. When the methodology is concerned with strategy selection, feeling-of-knowing turns out to be based solely on the cues of the question. […] It seems to us that there is a more central function to feeling-of-knowing than just rating questions after the fact, specifically, to regulate strategy selection. It is important to emphasize that rapid feeling-of-knowing, assessed before retrieval failure, serves this function […] when presented with a general knowledge question, a person can decide, based on this initial, rapid feeling-of-knowing, whether to try to retrieve the answer from memory or to use another strategy, such as reasoning or looking up the answer in a textbook. Similarly, after presentation of a novel math problem (e.g. 26 x 43), it would be this initial rapid feeling-of-knowing which would help a person decide either to retrieve or to calculate the answer. If the initial feeling-of-knowing for the problem is high, the person tries to retrieve the answer; if the feeling-of-knowing is low, the person computes the answer. Note that it is possible for the person to choose to compute even if the answer is stored in memory, and conversely, it is possible to choose to retrieve when the answer is not known. […] the rapid, preliminary feeling-of-knowing stage necessarily occurs before the retrieval attempt, because it is a product of parsing the question. Consequently, feeling-of-knowing is a natural precursor to the retrieval process. […] trace access theories can explain a positive feeling-of-knowing when access is blocked or delayed, but they do not easily explain illusions of knowing: cases in which a high feeling-of-knowing rating is – wrongly – assigned to a question while the correct response is totally unknown. If the feeling-of-knowing is to be generated by a partially accessed trace, it is difficult to imagine how a feeling-of-knowing can be generated when the subject does not know the answer.”

“The feeling-of-knowing may be affected by numerous variables. Cue familiarity, domain familiarity, contextual or normative information, recency of use have all been found to influence the feeling-of-knowing rating […]. It can also be affected by episodic elements like remembering the context in which the response might have been acquired, and even by more social or normative elements like estimates of the probability that the response will be known by people the subject usually interacts with […]. Most of these elements are correlated, so it is not easy to determine which has the most important weight.”

“The problems involved in assigning a rating to a dimension like accessibility also appear theoretically similar to the problems involved in Clore’s (1992) description of how mood can be used as information. […] In both cases a single continuum is involved and a single intensity value is returned. Just as various events have an influence on our mood, various inferential cues condition accessibility. In both cases this “confounding” of influence sources is usually acceptable from the subjects’ point of view because there is a general correlation between the sources, but both cases involve a potential attribution problem that is directly related to this “confounding.” In the case of the feeling-of-knowing, high accessibility may be due to a number of factors, some of them related to the existence of an appropriate response, some related to extraneous considerations (inferential aspects), some related, even, to elements of information that do not constitute a proper answer.”

“empirical social psychology provides ample evidence that people make use of metacognitive assessments, whether they are aware of those assessments or not. For instance, it has been found that people search the facial expressions and non-verbal behaviors of others in order to figure out how others perceive a given situation, and this helps them to determine how they themselves feel about that situation […] In research on social influence, it is found that people almost always revise their own judgments to make them more similar to the judgments of others […], especially when people have (even the slightest) reason to question the credibility of their own knowledge […]. Some social psychologists have argued that we do not know what we think until we know what other people think […]. Even when our own thoughts and feelings are relatively clear to us, we still estimate and adjust for the thoughts and feelings of others in order to best follow our own interaction goals […]. All of these cases involve metacognitive judgments, that is, cognitive assessments that are about the cognitions of the self.”

“That situationally given “data” are interpreted in terms of participants’ extant theories or conceptions is especially clear in recent research by Strack and his colleagues on the subject of reconstructive memory […] people hold intuitive theories about what sorts of things they are likely to remember and what sorts of things they are likely to forget, and these notions play an important role in confidence judgments about whether or not a stimulus has appeared previously. For instance, students may be more certain about the fact that their professor was not wearing a sombrero during the last class period than about the fact that their professor was not wearing a pair of glasses […]. This is because people make important metacognitive judgments about whether they would have remembered a particular occurrence, even when they do not remember the actual occurrence […]. Strack and Bless (1994) have demonstrated further that people possess very subtle assumptions that numerically distinctive categories will be remembered better than numerically non-distinctive categories. As a result, people are more confident in their decision that a given event did not occur when that type of event would have been infrequent than when it would have been a frequent occurrence. Other work indicates that people are also more confident in their memories when the previously exposed set of items was small rather than large […] in attempting to remember one’s past attitudes, feelings, or abilities, one often begins with present attitudes or mental states and makes adjustments to those on the basis of implicit theories about personal stability and change. Because people generally believe that factors such as intelligence and political party affiliation are stable entities, they tend to overestimate the extent to which their present capacities and affiliations are the same as those they possessed in years gone by (Ross, 1989).”

“In sum, it appears that the assessment of self-knowledge is derived from whatever specific information is perceived as relevant to the task at hand or to the general processes by which knowledge is achieved. Such information may consist of subjective feelings and experiences as well as cultural theories and category-based information about people in certain social groups. Subjective feelings are interpreted in terms of prior cognitive notions that may be momentarily activated in the individual’s memory. Such notions may include long-standing beliefs as to how knowledge states are represented in momentary sensations (e.g. that a sense of fluency or familiarity indicates the validity of a hypothesis one was entertaining) or naive theories about the workings of memory (e.g. that one may have better memory for unusual or infrequent events). Metacognitive theories engender expectations about cognitive performance, and these expectations are capable of impacting actual judgments, memories, and intellectual performances through social psychological processes of “expectancy confirmation” or the “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Jones. 1990). […] Social metacognitive phenomena of the type we have been reviewing have an obvious bearing on the accuracy of people’s self-perceptions and judgments. To the extent that people’s attributions about their momentary states, such as causal explanations pertaining to their mood, are false, any inferences based upon those attributions, such as judgments of global life-satisfaction, are likely to be inaccurate. If, however, correct attributions are made, then the inferences derived from those attributions have a greater likelihood of being accurate. […] people often accept their own perceptual experiences as unquestionably true. […] “feelings,” “sensations,” and “experiences” are [however] heavily influenced by interpretive and inferential processes based upon potentially malleable lay theories, and so the metacognitive inferences drawn on the basis of those feelings may often lack veridicality, despite the directness of the subjective experience […] subjective experiences or unconscious memories may often give rise to faulty judgments”

“The metacognitive processes whereby momentary feelings or sensations are identified and inferences are drawn from these identifications are highly dynamic. Social psychological research indicates that the extent, directionality, and duration of metacognitive inferences should be affected by the individual’s motivation and cognitive capacity. When cognitive capacity or processing motivation are low, metacognitive processes are likely to be limited and early interpretations are likely to be anchored or “fixated” upon. However, when information processing capacity and motivation are high, a number of metacognitive interpretations may be entertained. This multiplicity of conceptions may occasionally produce confusion and undermine the individual’s sense of secure knowledge. Thus, recent research suggests that conditions such as time pressure or environmental noise tend to limit a person’s cognitive capacity and motivation and consequently reduce the number of interpretative hypotheses that he or she considers, increasing at the same time his or her subjective sense of judgmental confidence. By contrast, conditions that increase a person’s capacity or processing motivation not only increase the number of hypotheses generated, but they concomitantly reduce his or her confidence”

“Divining other people’s knowledge is essential to functional social interaction. […] But how does one go about assessing another persons’ knowledge? Research has identified several informational sources that people may use for that purpose. First, people may use their own knowledge or opinions as a basis for making projections about the knowledge of others. Second, people may use “actuarial” knowledge or statistical information about what people in general think or what a specific group of people think about a given topic. Third, people may attend to a given person’s individualized reactions to a stimulus. All three of these informational sources have figured in social psychological research on metacognitive assessments of other people’s minds. […] people are more likely to impute a piece of knowledge to others if they possess this knowledge themselves than if they do not, and people are likely to overestimate the commonality of their own knowledge. […] In a wide variety of domains, it appears that people exaggerate the commonality of their own attitudes, feelings, and behaviors […] Subjective “feelings,” “sensations,” and so-called “inner experiences” are relevant and accessible only with regard to one’s own assessment of knowledge. Because subjective events of this type can be subject to misidentification (or misattribution), however, they do not necessarily confer an accuracy advantage to the assessment of self-knowledge as compared with the assessment of others’ knowledge.”

“Rather than using self-knowledge as a standard from which other people’s beliefs are inferred, perceivers sometimes make use of statistical or “base rate” information […] Several kinds of research suggest that people generally underutilize category-based, actuarial information in the face of even the slightest amount of individuating information […]. Nevertheless, it has been found that base rate information is taken into account by lay perceivers when it is perceived as specifically relevant to the judgment being rendered […], when the diagnosticity of the individuating information is diminished in some way […], or when the categorical information is congruent with the perceiver’s information-processing goal or task orientation […]. Furthermore, research on social stereotypes demonstrates that category-based information is utilized when it is readily accessible in memory […], when the perceiver is highly motivated to achieve cognitive closure […], or when the perceiver possesses an especially low degree of accuracy motivation […]. Under these diverse sets of circumstances, it should be expected that people will rely on actuarial information to draw inferences about the mental states of others.”

 

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August 30, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment

Habituation: Theories, Characteristics and Biological Mechanisms

As already mentioned, this book was one of the books I read last week. I gave it two stars on goodreads.

The book did not have a goodreads profile, so I had to add one. When books don’t have goodreads profiles and/or I’m unable to find an amazon rating, I usually end up (cautiously) assuming that the book probably has not been read by, well, let’s use the words ‘a lot of people’. As you may be able to tell from the goodreads book description which I included in the profile at the link above, it’s a book which deals with some slightly obscure stuff: “Topics include the important roles for matrix metalloproteinases and cell adhesion molecules in long-term potentiation (LTP)” and “a mathematical description of habituation and recovery of the head-shake response in rats“. The description at the link is a quote from the book – it’s the first paragraph of the preface. Some of the stuff in here is fairly technical and really quite difficult to blog also on account of being somewhat difficult to summarize – for these reasons there was some stuff in the book which I decided against covering here despite it being interesting, including most of the first chapter. The stuff I decided to exclude includes the stuff about ‘important roles for matrix metalloproteinases and cell adhesion molecules’ but I also decided to exclude the coverage of the drug addiction stuff in that chapter, however for a different reason; I’ve dealt with this kind of stuff before, and Clark et al.’s coverage go into much more detail than does this book.

Below I have added some observations from the book and a few remarks of my own.

“Nonassociative learning is considered to be the simplest form of learning and includes the phenomena of habituation, dishabituation, and sensitization. Of these phenomena, habituation is the most frequently studied and refers to a decrease in responding, as related to frequency, magnitude, or intensity to a stimulus repeatedly presented, or presented for a prolonged period of time […] Habituation has been documented across many species and response systems ranging from the gill-withdrawal reflex in Aplysia [sea slugs] […] and tap withdrawal or chemotaxic response in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans [a ~1 mm long roundworm] […], to acoustic startle response in rats and mice […], schedules of reinforcement in operant conditioning […] and feeding in humans (Myers and Epstein, 2002).”

“From the viewpoint of neuroscience, tinnitus has been defined as (i) the perception of a sound in the ear in the absence of external stimulation […]; (ii) an ongoing conscious perception of a sound in the absence of any external sound source […]; (iii) the conscious perception of a sound that is not generated by any source outside the body […]; (iv) a phantom auditory perception or the perception of abnormal activity not induced by any combination of external sounds […]. As documented almost thirty years ago by Coles (1984), approximately 14-18 per cent of the population included in an epidemiological study in Great Britain reported tinnitus. Findings from a community survey conducted in Gothenburg, Sweden showed that 14.2 per cent suffer “always” or “often”, and it has been estimated that 1-2 per cent perceive tinnitus as a plague all day or as a threat towards quality of life […]. More recent epidemiological surveys from China (Xu et al. 2011) and Egypt (Khedr et al. 2010) demonstrate that tinnitus can be a significant problem for the inhabitants in the eastern part of the world as well. Overall prevalence of tinnitus in a population of 6333 inhabitants in a province (Jiangsu) in China was 12.4 per cent and standardized rates for China was calculated to be 11.4 per cent. […] In a survey in Assiut, Egypt including 4848 inhabitants prevalence rate of tinnitus was 5.17 per cent. […] Along with these results, earlier epidemiological studies also disclosed that a large proportion of individuals do not seek help for having tinnitus, so a clinically relevant question to rise was, and still is, why some patients are plagued by tinnitus, while others seem to be able to cope. In one of the first larger tinnitus populations studies Meikle et al. (1983) investigated the relationship between tinnitus loudness obtained by a loudness balance procedure and tinnitus severity ratings in 1800 patients attending a tinnitus clinic. No significant correlation was found between tinnitus loudness and severity. Neither was the severity ratings associated to type, quality and the pitch of tinnitus.”

I thought prevalence was significantly lower than that, but I must admit that i did not have good reasons for assuming this. Tinnitus seems to be yet another one of those sneaky health problems which are both reasonably hard to observe when other people suffer from them (you can’t tell if someone has tinnitus or not unless the individual in question tells you that he or she does) and actually quite common. The chapter has a lot of stuff, much of which are critical remarks towards current therapeutic approaches and the interpretive frameworks (there are two relevant models, a ‘psychological model’ and a ‘neurophysiological model’) on which they are based. The reason why this condition is included in the book is that a habituation process often occurs in people who are affected by this condition – most people with tinnitus adjust to some extent to the condition. However: “To date, habituation to tinnitus remains an unexplained process [and] it is not legitimate to state that tolerance to tinnitus is a natural process”. Habituation is the common outcome, but sometimes it fails and they don’t really seem to have a good explanatory model of what goes wrong when it does. It should be noted that a few of the people who do not habituate to tinnitus end up killing themselves – so figuring out more about this stuff is most certainly not unimportant to some of the people who are affected. Some of the details which are clear at this point is that the habituation process relates to a lot of stuff besides what’s going on in the ear, and that some treatment-relevant patient heterogeneities do not seem to be taken into account in the current treatment modalities on offer (or for that matter in the theoretical models on which the treatment modalities are based). Incidentally it may be a mistake to think of the neurological research into these things as only being relevant to the organism’s ‘response to tinnitus’, as such processes may well also be implicated in the pathophysiology more broadly defined – at least this is how I interpret some of the findings. For example they point out in chapter 5 of the book that: “recent auditory neuroscience research has suggested that an imbalance of excitatory and inhibitory neural interactions within the auditory cortex could lead to the perception of tinnitus”.

“The model of orientation and habituation that will be discussed is derived from the work of Sokolov (1975). Sokolov postulated that production of an orienting response is dependent on incongruity between incoming stimulus and existing neural templates that are created by previously stored memory traces of environmental stimuli. The neural template or model encodes all aspects of the stimulus including duration, interstimulus interval and the relationship between several stimuli across time. If there is a mismatch between the new stimuli and the neuronal template, sensitization to the stimulus occurs and a response will be generated. If the new stimulus matches the neural template, habituation occurs (i.e., decrease in responding to repeated presentations of the same stimuli). […] If a stimulus differs in any way from the original stimulus presented (i.e. higher or lower pitch), the orienting response will reappear to a previously habituated stimulus because of the change. Sokolov termed the reappearance of the orienting response dishabituation. […] It is argued that Sokolov’s model captures the organism’s ability to modulate internal memory traces and compare these traces to external stimuli to determine the importance or irrelevance of stimuli in the environment. However, it does not directly address the activation or suppression of the motor system in orienting to novelty or inhibiting responding to irrelevant stimuli. Orienting must involve two interactive channels of information processing: automatic and conscious. These two channels must be integrated by feedforward and feedback interconnections that involve many functional brain systems. The widespread involvement of different brain regions is further implicated by the research finding of cingulotomy patients. […] damage to the cingulate can produce attentional impairments.”

“It is proposed that orientation and habituation occur through the modulation of both internal and external states. The modulation of information occurs in three separate levels as follows: (1) memory comparator level, (2) value-appraisal level, and (3) behavioral-response/decision-making level […]. All of these levels are processing the information simultaneously through synchronized connections of neural circuits between the functional areas involved. The memory comparator level is composed of the hippocampus.
The value-appraisal system is composed of the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex and peripheral nervous system. The peripheral nervous system is important in controlling the organism’s arousal system. One division expends energy (sympathetic) and the other division conserves energy (parasympathetic). The behavioral-response/decision-making level is composed of the cerebellum, basal ganglia, premotor, motor cortex and anterior cingulate. It is proposed that the cerebellum is the key structure involved in linking the temporal properties of signals especially with regard to the basal ganglia and the anterior cingulate.
It is also proposed that the anterior cingulate plays an important role in coordinating internal and external influences on stimuli processing and response monitoring. The anterior cingulate receives initial information as well as feedback; it determines priorities in selecting which stimuli to attend and respond to. There is considerable agreement in the literature indicating that the role of the anterior cingulate cortex is to assist in bringing together the influences of internal and external stimuli with behavioral goals and plans for activation […] Evidence from animal, clinical and neuroimaging studies indicates that the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in directing attention and action by modulating cognitive and affective states […] The anterior cingulate cortex may be involved in processing competing inputs and inhibiting competing actions (Pardo, Pardo, Janer and Raichle, 1990) or directing attentional responses when there are multiple or competing inputs and action (Pardo, Fox, and Raichle, 1991). In this sense the anterior cingulate has several roles but its most important role may be in optimizing behavioral stability. […] The proposed three levels of modulation are highly dependent on the diffuse and broadly distributed neuronal circuits in the brain.”

“The NE [neurotransmitter norepinephrine] system serves a very specific function; it maintains the basic level of excitability, arousal, and attentiveness.
The NE system plays an important modulatory role in learning, memory, and retrieval. Norepinephrine also appears to be more inhibitory than excitatory. Over activity can lead to hypervigilance and anxiety and under activity can lead to depression. Norepinephrine is known to be involved in behavioral arousal due to the affects of certain drugs. Amphetamine and cocaine act on NE and are both potent brain stimulants. Several studies have provided evidence that effects of stimulus significance and stimulus repetition are a function of noradrenergic control originating in the pontine nucleus LC.” [Yes, I noticed the spelling errors and they were part of the reason why I included this paragraph in the coverage – to illustrate this aspect of the coverage. Sloppiness like this is part of why I gave the book two stars. The chapter from which this quote is taken is not that terrible, but chapter five – written by a couple of Italian researchers – is quite bad.]

“Neurons do not operate in isolation; each neuron affects the activation of another neuron. The connections between neurons can be excitatory (the firing of one neuron makes the other more likely to send its own signal), or inhibitory (the firing of one neuron makes the other less likely to send its own signal). The excitatory or inhibitory effects neurons have on each other are an important construct in the present model. Connections between neurons (or neural circuits) are determined by the strength between them, or in other words, the degree to which the activation of one affects the activation of another. Too little strength between the neurons or an imbalance in neural synchronization can cause a disruption in processing. The efficient processing of neural circuits can also become weakened when other circuits interfere with their functioning. Of additional importance is the fact that neural connections can be made stronger or weaker through learning. […] In the proposed model sensory information from the environment is received in the amplifying system (thalamus, reticular activating system), which is responsible for arousal, amplification and relay of signals. Information is then forwarded to the memory comparator system (hippocampus), the value-appraisal system (amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex), and behavioral-response/decision-making system (cerebellum, basal ganglia, anterior cingulate, and motor areas). In processing information for decisional action, the organism will habituate if there is a memory trace in the hippocampus (event memory with affect) and cerebellum (motor response memories) from prior experience. If the organism habituates to irrelevant information, the RAS [reticular activating system] is tonically inhibited by the hippocampus and cerebellum. If there are no memory traces, the organism is aroused to process the sensory signal for its affective/motivational salience by the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex. The cerebellum initiates a motor response (“what is it”) at which time the basal ganglia and anterior cingulate become activated for further processing. After the initial stimulus is processed in these regions, information is sent back to sensory areas thus creating a feedback loop. As information in the environment is being refined and updated, sensory areas continue to receive new input and the feedback from the monitored response as well. In this sense, a dynamic and complex process that is cyclical in nature is proposed. Stimulus perception, selection, and response initiation is being fed forward and fed back at each stage in processing and the influences of these processes are sorted for priority by the anterior cingulate cortex. Thus orientation and habituation is a continuous process that enables the organism the flexibility to adapt to changes in the internal and external environment.”

“Habituation is not only a gating mechanism that is extremely critical in attentional processes but it also dampens arousal (e.g., reticular activating system) and motor behavior […]. Thus habituation is a process that also involves inhibitory control. Stated differently, the same mechanisms of habituation would be recruited to sustain willed attention to an activity (e.g., habituating to environmental distractors in order to read a book) and to automatically capture attention if the demands of the environment change (e.g., sound of a fire alarm that pulls our attention from reading). Overall, research findings indicate that habituation processes are impaired in ADHD […], ASD [autism spectrum disorder] […] and TBI [traumatic brain injury] […]. Moreover, the deficits in habituation facilitate the explanation of the characteristic symptoms of these disorders […] At the present time however, the underlying neural correlates of habituation can only be speculated”.

There isn’t a lot of research supporting the ‘research findings’ part above (the ASD part is only supported by one “unpublished manuscript”…), but this seems to be the kind of stuff some people are looking into these days.

“Habituation is a reduction in responsiveness to repeated or prolonged stimulation; that allows nervous system filters to identify biologically less relevant input in the flow of sensory information, and in turn devote more attention and processing energy toward more relevant or dynamic stimuli. This form of non-associative learning enables an animal to perceptually deemphasize persistent o[r] static stimuli in favour of novel of changing stimuli. Habituation has been described experimentally in multiple sensory modalities within various invertebrate and vertebrate species including sea slugs, fruit flies, nematodes, birds and mammals [1]. The observed decrements in responding in reflexive behavior are not mediated by motor fatigue or adaptation at the level of sensory receptors. The distinction between fatigue and habituation is commonly made by demonstrating that the response decrement is specific to the repeated stimulus [2], [3]. Change in stimulation, such as introduction of an intense stimulus, allows a return of responsiveness (dishabituation) or heightened responsiveness (sensitization). […] Habituation reflects an intact central nervous system (CNS) with normal functioning [10]; habituation can be detected before birth [11–13] and can be used to evaluate the maturation of the fetal CNS [14].”

“Habituation in olfaction allows the olfactory system to maintain equilibrium with the odorant concentrations in the ambient environment, yet respond appropriately to the appearance of novel odors or changes in odorant concentration. Olfactory habituation can be induced by multiple paradigms that differ in timescale and are thought to be mediated by distinct mechanisms within different regions of the olfactory system […] Some studies have revealed that the odors are processed differently in relation to their valence: chemosensory evoked potentials towards pleasant and unpleasant odors change with repeated presentation [47], in particular unpleasant odor produced earlier response, as for fulfil their warning function about potential threats [48].”

“The traditional definition of motion sickness has been the onset of vomiting or nausea experienced by the land, air, sea, or space traveler that results in impaired function. Motion sickness can be induced […] by either physical motion or stimuli that result in perceived motion […] Manifestations of motion sickness may include visual and postural instability, pallor, diaphoresis, excess salivation, sweating, dizziness, malaise, headaches , anxiety, hyperventilation, nausea and vomiting. All of them are attributable to activation of the autonomic system in response to vestibular stimuli [50], as if motion sickness itself could have evolved from a system designed to protect from potential ingestion of neurotoxins, by inducing vomiting when unexpected central nervous system inputs are detected (the “toxin detector” hypothesis)[51]. Less popular alternatives to the toxin detector hypothesis propose that motion sickness could be the result of aberrant activation of vestibular-cardiovascular reflexes [52], or that motion sickness is a unfortunate consequence of the physical proximity of the motion detector (vestibular) and vomiting circuitry in the brainstem [53]. […] a conflict between visual and vestibular information regarding spatial orientation has been identified as the primary causal factor for motion sickness [56]. […] The principles of habituation have been applied with varying success to reduce or prevent motion sickness in pilots and astronauts [57–59]. Habituation programs pioneered by military are effective but time consuming. […] Research on habituation training has focused on the use of visual or vestibular stimuli, and results support the concept that habituation is stimuli-specific [62]: tolerance to car travel may have no effect on susceptibility to seasickness.”

August 27, 2014 Posted by | autism, Biology, Books, Medicine, Neurology, Psychology | Leave a comment

Meta/Open Thread

I dislike brief updates like these, but I figured it was better in this case to post it than to not post it. As I mentioned earlier, last week I did not have internet access – I am now back online. However I am also very exhausted and I have some things that need to get done (these ‘things’ include ‘sleep’) before I can justify spending the amount of time a regular blogpost takes me to write. I expected before going offline that I would be able to post something yesterday, but things did not go as planned.

I didn’t read much during the week I was offline, but I did manage to read Buskirk et al. and Yzerbyt et al., as well as a couple of Christie novels I have no intention of covering here on the blog – see my goodreads profile for details if you’re curious about those. I’ll not resume regular blogging until tomorrow afternoon/evening at the earliest, but things should after that return to normal quite soon.

As I don’t have a lot of stuff to contribute to the conversation at the moment, I thought it would be apposite to let this be an Open Thread as well. Questions, recommendations, random remarks, etc., are all welcome.

August 26, 2014 Posted by | Open Thread | Leave a comment

Persuasion and negotiation

This will be my last post about Hargie’s book. I covered many aspects of ‘the skill of persuasion’ in a previous post, but that chapter had a lot of stuff, so I’ve included a little more from that chapter below, as well as some stuff from the chapter on negotiation (on the other hand I decided not to talk about the second-to-last ‘skills in groups’ chapter at all, because that chapter was so terrible it made me want to beat up the author). A lot of the non-theoretical stuff in the negotiation chapter is incidentally based on a single study (the Rackham study), so some caution is probably warranted when you’re interpreting findings in this area.

“the phenomenon of reactance […] refers to the reaction we have to the imposition of restrictions on our freedom. Such reaction involves a combination of anger and negative cognitions, such as counter-arguing and source derogation […] Reactance can be reduced by various strategies. What is known as the but you are free to accept or to refuse technique has been shown to increase the success of a request […]. Here, the agent makes a request but adds the caveat that the person has the freedom to refuse. Having been given this ‘increased’ freedom, people feel more in control and less under duress, with the result that they become more acquiescent. Likewise, acknowledging resistance increases compliance. By simply saying ‘I know you might not want to, but . . .’ before making the request the agent can increase the number of people who comply. […] When we are threatened by something being denied to us, we react to this threat by experiencing an increased desire for the restricted item. Indeed, the more restricted an item, the greater tends to be its appeal. […] A key implication of this is that we can persuade others to do something by convincing them that there is scarcity value attached to it. […] There are three important factors attached to scarcity value: […] Resources attain an even greater value when they are seen to be newly scarce. […] If we have to compete for the scarce resource it attains even greater attraction in our eyes. […] Losses are more influential than gains. […] Thus, the prospect of something becoming scarce as a result of losing it motivates us more than the thought of gaining something of equal value.”

“A powerful human drive is the desire to be regarded as consistent. We have a need to show others that we mean what we say and will do what we promise. This means that once we have made a public declaration of commitment to a course of action we are more likely to rate it highly and continue with it. A ubiquitous strategy in many organisations and institutions is to get people to make such a declaration. […] once people perform a certain behaviour or publicly state a point of view they are then more likely to infer in retrospect that they really believe in what they said or did […]. In reviewing this area Cialdini (2001: 96) concluded: ‘Commitments are most effective when they are active, public, effortful, and viewed as internally motivated (uncoerced).’ […] If the behaviour has been freely chosen, the individual is more committed to it. There is now a huge volume of research to show that freedom of choice is a central factor in the influence equation.”

“One way of ensuring that people stay committed to the message they have recently been persuaded to adopt is to get them to proselytise about it. This tactic is used by many religions and cults. […] Having to ‘sell’ the message means that it becomes cognitively embedded and resistant to change. It is more difficult later to reject that which you have publicly and vehemently espoused. […] People also rate the strength and depth of their belief or attitude based upon the extent of effort they have shown to it in the past. […] We are heavily influenced by commitments that are irrevocable. If there is a possibility that we can change our minds, the alternatives may linger and eventually influence our behaviour. However, if the deed is final, we are more likely to become convinced of its worth.”

“The main decisions to be made during a negotiation encounter can be interpreted in terms of a ‘negotiation decision tree’ […]. The first decision is whether or not to enter into negotiation at all. […] If a decision is taken not to negotiate, then the […] Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) should already have been formulated. […] Two aspects of the BATNA are important. First, the opposing side may attempt to moderate your perceptions of your BATNA in a negative fashion. […] Second, you should attempt to ascertain what the other side’s BATNA is, and be aware that they may not tell the truth about this.”

“Rackham (2007) found that skilled negotiators were significantly more likely to plan in terms of a settlement range (e.g. ‘I’d like 30 per item but would settle for 26 minimum.’), whereas average negotiators planned around a fixed point (e.g. ‘I want to get 28 per item.’). It has also been shown that negotiators obtain better results if they focus their efforts upon achieving their target point rather than concentrating upon not going below their resistance point [“This is the bottom line beyond which you decide that a deal will not be done”] […]. Some research has found that males tend to set higher target points than females, and so achieve higher gains. […] females who make higher demands tend to be evaluated more negatively than males who negotiate at the same level […] It is important to remember that the other party has target and resistance points. Deals will be struck somewhere between the two sets of resistance points, and so this is known as the settlement range. […] One of the first things an experienced negotiator attempts to do is to ascertain the target and resistance points of the other side, so a deal can be made that is closer to the opponent’s resistance point.”

“A significant finding is that negotiators often reciprocate each other’s use of strategies and tactics […]. This process, where the approach adopted by one side causes the other to reciprocate, is known as entrainment […]. if one party seems frosty and adopts a rather belligerent opening stance, it is likely that the other will follow suit; threats will provoke counter-threats, demands counter-demands and so on. On the other hand, a more integrative, cooperative and amenable approach is also likely to be responded to in kind (Weingart et al., 1999).”

“breakdowns in the negotiation process can often be traced back to a lack of time devoted to initial exploration and clarification of demands, needs and wants.”

“there is evidence from distributive negotiation that if the seller makes the initial offer, the settlement price is higher than if the buyer makes the initial offer”

“Concessions lead to position loss, which can be interpreted as a willingness to compromise and be cooperative. However, if too many are conceded too quickly this can result in image loss where the person is viewed as someone weak and easily manipulated. Interestingly, Morris et al. (1999) discovered that negotiators often attribute the bargaining behaviour of the other party to personality and personal predispositions (e.g. disagreeableness, truculence) rather than to the circumstances of the negotiation with which they are confronted. Such misperception can evoke a more hostile response, if a lack of willingness to compromise is attributed to the other party being seen as an obstinate or greedy individual, as opposed to being interpreted as due to the fact that the organisation to which the person belongs has given strict guidelines about what can and cannot be negotiated. A core dimension of negotiation is the ability to persuade the opposition to make concessions.”

“Bargainers should: • not concede too readily • make concessions as small as possible • monitor the number and rate of concession making • link concessions to an image of firmness.
Bargainers should not: • concede too soon in the negotiations • make the first main concession • make unilateral concessions
• make large initial concessions – this is likely to give an impression of weakness • concede without due consideration of the positive and negative consequences for both parties • always engage in reciprocal concessions. A concession by the other side may be justified in its own right […] The most effective negotiators are those who, as well as being able to think logically, can also understand and control their emotions […] High levels of anger have been shown to be destructive to the negotiation process”

“Rackham (2007) found that skilled negotiators asked over twice as many questions as average negotiators. Questions serve several important functions in negotiations. A primary purpose is to gather detailed information about the other side and their aspirations and concerns. They also allow the questioner to control the focus and flow of the interaction […] When one side has put forward an argument it is likely that a blunt statement of disagreement will increase their antagonism and aggression and make them less likely to give in. […] The calm presentation of counter-arguments, without a public statement of negation, encourages logical debate such that the eventual acceptance of alternative proposals then involves much less loss of face. It is therefore a useful general rule to always give reasons before (or as an alternative to) expressing disagreement.”

“A mistake made by inexperienced negotiators is to respond to a proposal with an immediate counterproposal […] Rackham (2007) found that skilled negotiators used about 50 per cent fewer counterproposals than average negotiators. Counterproposals are not recommended in negotiation […] Less skilled negotiators tend to give more reasons to justify their bids. This is not good practice since the more reasons that are proffered, the better chance the opposition has of finding and highlighting a weakness in at least one of them. […] Rackham (2007) argued that this is because weaker arguments tend to dilute stronger ones. […] Skilled negotiators tended to put forward one reason at a time and would only introduce another reason if they were in danger of losing ground.”

 

August 23, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment

Quotes

i. “One must wait until the evening to see how splendid the day was; one cannot judge life until death.” (Charles de Gaulle)

ii. “Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak. Courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.” (Winston Churchill)

iii. “The intensity of people’s views on a topic is inversely proportional to the amount of evidence available on the topic.” (Jeffrey Hammer)

iv. “Silence is the best resolve for him who distrusts himself.” (Rochefoucauld)

v. “Old men delight in giving good advice as a consolation for the fact that they can no longer set bad examples.” (-ll-)

vi. “No man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.” (-ll-)

vii. “However we distrust the sincerity of those whom we talk with, we always believe them more sincere with us than with others.” (-ll-)

viii. “No people are more often wrong than those who will not allow themselves to be wrong.” (-ll-)

ix. “We have few faults which are not far more excusable than the means we adopt to hide them.” (-ll-)

x. “We should earnestly desire but few things if we clearly knew what we desired.” (-ll-)

xi. “Those who quit their proper character to assume what does not belong to them, are for the greater part ignorant both of the character they leave and of the character they assume.” (Edmund Burke)

xii. “Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver.” (-ll-)

xiii. “Patience, n. A minor form of despair, disguised as a virtue.” (Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary)

xiv. “Preference, n. A sentiment, or frame of mind, induced by the erroneous belief that one thing is better than another.” (-ll-)

xv. “Religion, n. A daughter of Hope and Fear, explaining to Ignorance the nature of the Unknowable.” (-ll-)

xvi. “Ultimatum, n. In diplomacy, a last demand before resorting to concessions.” (-ll-)

xvii. “Idiot, n. A member of a large and powerful tribe whose influence in human affairs has always been dominant and controlling.” (-ll-)

xviii. “I share no man’s opinions; I have my own.” (Ivan Turgenev)

xix. “You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you.” (Eric Hoffer)

xx. “Virtue never has been as respectable as money.” (Mark Twain)

 

August 21, 2014 Posted by | Quotes/aphorisms | Leave a comment

Social skills (ctd.)

In this post I’ll cover a bit more of Hargie’s stuff. I once again refer to this post for general comments and observations.

“There is now a considerable volume of research into the accuracy of first impressions (AFI). Those who score highly in terms of AFI tend to be more socially skilled, popular with peers, experience lower levels of loneliness, depression and anxiety, have higher quality of personal relationships, and achieve more senior positions and higher salaries at work. In their review of this area, Hall and Andrzejewski (2008: 98) concluded: ‘A large amount of research shows that it is good to be able to draw accurate inferences about people based on first impressions.’ […] we make evaluations of others at a very early stage and based upon minimal evidence […] Thus, Willis and Todorov (2006) demonstrated that after as little as one-tenth of a second we have made inferences based upon the facial appearance of the other person, and we then tend to become anchored on this initial judgement. Our early perceptions influence our expectations, and this in turn shapes our behaviour. Initial perceptions also impact upon subsequent processing, since we tend to adapt any conflicting information to make it fit more easily with our existing cognitive frame (Adler et al., 2006).” [See also Funder]

“People organise their physical spaces to make statements about their identity […] we form impressions of individuals based on how they organise their spaces. […] Thus, the nature of the environment affects initial impressions. […] The age, sex, dress and general appearance of the other person all affect the initial perceptual set that is induced […] In their review of this area, Whetzel and McDaniel (1999: 222) concluded: ‘Interviewers’ reactions to job candidates are strongly influenced by style of dress and grooming. Persons judged to be attractive or appropriately groomed or attired, received higher ratings than those judged to be inappropriately dressed or unattractive.’ […] in their review of the field Roehling et al. (2008: 392) concluded: ‘Research indicates that overweight job applicants and employees are stereotypically viewed as being less conscientiousness, less agreeable, less emotionally stable, and less extraverted than their “normal-weight” counterparts.’”

“In many interpersonal transactions, one encounter is influenced by decisions made and commitments undertaken in the previous meeting. […] ‘When people meet and interact with new acquaintances, they often use expectations about what these other people will be like to guide their interactions.’ In this way, people approach social encounters with certain explicit or implicit expectations, which they expect to have fulfilled (Hamilton, 2005). If expectations are unrealistic or misplaced, it is important to discover this and make it clear at a very early stage.”

“Those with a high need for closure [see this post for details on this variable] are more heavily influenced by first impressions as they search for aspects to seize upon in terms of decision making. They desire clearly structured interactions with transparent goals, and readily accept the need to bring an encounter to an end in a neat and tidy manner. On the other hand, individuals with a low need for closure are less likely to make judgements based upon initial information. They prefer interactions that are loosely structured with less clear-cut goals, and they can be difficult to persuade that it is time to terminate an interaction. As a result, with this type of person, closure can be more prolonged and messier.”

“a crucial determinant of assertion is motivation to act rather than lack of understanding of how to be assertive.”

“submissive people laugh much more at the humour of dominant individuals than vice versa”

“In reviewing research in this field, Rakos (1991) illustrated how nonassertive individuals emit roughly equal numbers of positive and negative self-statements in conflict situations whereas assertive people generate about twice as many positive as negative self-statements. […] Nonassertive individuals have a higher frequency of negative self-statements and a greater belief that their behaviour will lead to negative consequences.”

“Nonassertive responses involve expressing oneself in such a self-effacing, apologetic manner that one’s thoughts, feelings and rights can easily be ignored. […] The objective here is to appease others and avoid conflict at any cost. […] Nonassertive individuals: • tend to avoid public attention • use minimal self-disclosure or remain silent so as not to receive criticism for what they say • are modest and self-deprecating • use self-handicapping strategies whereby they underestimate potential future achievements so as to avoid negative evaluation if they fail • if they have to engage with others, prefer to play a passive, friendly and very agreeable role. […] Assertive responses involve standing up for oneself, yet taking the other person into consideration. The assertive style involves: • answering spontaneously • speaking with a conversational yet firm tone and volume • looking at the other person • addressing the main issue • openly and confidently expressing personal feelings and opinions • valuing oneself equal to others • being prepared to listen to the other’s point of view […] Verbal aggression has been defined as ‘behavior that attacks an individual’s self-concept in order to deliver psychological pain’ […] Such behaviours include attacks on one’s ability, character or appearance, name calling, profanity, the use of demands, blunt directives and threats – all of which violate the rights of the other person. Using this style, the aggressor: • interrupts and answers before the other is finished speaking • talks loudly and abrasively • glares at the other person • speaks ‘past’ the issue (accusing, blaming, demeaning) • vehemently and arrogantly states feelings and opinions in a dogmatic fashion • values self above others • hurts others to avoid personal hurt. […] Assertiveness forms the mid-point of this continuum and is usually the most appropriate response. Aggressive individuals tend to be viewed as intransigent, coercive, overbearing and lacking in self-control. They may initially get their own way by browbeating and creating fear in others, but they are usually disliked and avoided. Alternatively, this style may provoke a similar response from others, with the danger that the verbal aggression may escalate […] Nonassertive individuals, on the other hand, are often viewed as weak, ‘mealymouthed’ creatures who can be easily manipulated, and as a result they frequently express dissatisfaction with their lives, owing to a failure to attain personal goals. They may be less likely to inspire confidence in others or may even be seen as incompetent. […] One common pitfall is that individuals move from prolonged nonassertion straight into aggression, feeling they can no longer put up with being used, taken for granted or having their rights ignored. But such a sudden and unexpected explosion of anger is not the best approach, and indeed can destroy relationships.”

“There is consistent research evidence to show that standard direct assertion is viewed as being as effective as and more socially desirable than aggressive behaviour, and more socially competent but distinctly less likeable than nonassertion […]. It seems that assertiveness is evaluated positively in theory, but when faced with the practical reality is rated less favourably than nonassertion […] while people tend to respect assertive individuals, they often do not like to have to deal with assertive responses. […] We like and probably have more empathy for nonassertive people. Thus, assertion needs to be used sensitively. Assertiveness can provoke a number of adverse reactions. This may especially be the case when a change in style from submissiveness to assertiveness is made.”

“Humans, like all animals, are territorial and our sense of place is very important to how we respond […] it is easier to be assertive when we are on our own ground. […] Few individuals are assertive across all contexts. Most find it easier to assert themselves in some situations than in others. Attention needs to be devoted to situations in which the individual finds it difficult to be assertive, and strategies devised to overcome the particular problems.”

“The main nonverbal assertive behaviours are: medium levels of eye contact; avoidance of inappropriate facial expressions; smooth use of gestures while speaking, yet inconspicuous while listening; upright posture; direct body orientation; medium interpersonal distance; and appropriate paralinguistics (short response latency, medium response length, good fluency, medium volume and inflection, increased firmness).”

“In terms of definition, while the terms influence and persuasion are often viewed as synonyms and used interchangeably, in fact there are [some] differences between the two processes […] Knowles and Riner (2007) argued that persuasion is used to attempt to overcome some level of resistance to the message […] persuasion always involves influence [which does not require resistance to be present, US], but influence does not always involve persuasion. […] resistance can take many forms. Yukl (2010) identified six main variants: overt refusal to carry out the request; explanations or excuses as to why the request cannot be complied with; attempts to persuade the agent to alter or withdraw the request; appeals to a higher authority to have the request removed; delays in responding so that the requested action is not carried out; and pretending to comply while secretly attempting to sabotage the assignment. […] Targets can […] be encouraged to become more resistant to persuasion messages. There are two main methods whereby this can be achieved: forewarning and inoculation. […] [Forewarning] relates to the process wherein the target audience is told something about the person or message they are about to encounter. […] [Innoculation] is a stronger form of forewarning as it actively prepares targets to refute the messages that will be received”

“One issue that is linked to forewarning is whether or not there is any delay between warning and message delivery. In a meta-analysis of research in this field, the main conclusion reached by Benoit (1998: 146) was that: ‘Forewarning an audience to expect a persuasive message tends to make that message less persuasive . . . regardless of type of warning . . . (or) presence of delay.’ However, Benoit found that to be effective the warning must come before the persuasion attempt. A message does not lose its persuasiveness if the warning is given after it has been delivered. […] It appears that when targets are forewarned they adopt a less receptive frame of mind and become more resistant to the perceived ‘interference’. Overall, it is best not to have a forewarned target when making a persuasion attempt. […] The success of inoculation is affected by two main processes – delay and decay. Delay refers to the time it takes the target to generate counter-arguments with which to resist the message, while decay relates to the extent to which these arguments lose their force over time […]. Techniques that reduce delay and protect against decay are therefore important in maximising the effectiveness of inoculation. Thus, it has been shown that the more effort that targets devote to the development of counter-arguments to possible future challenges by engaging in what has been termed cognitive work, the greater is their resistance to later counter-persuasion attempts […]. Another useful antidote to delay and decay is the technique of rote learning. Many religions and cults get members to rote learn sets of beliefs, prayers and key statements (e.g. biblical passages) so that they become embedded in their psyche, and as such very resistant to change. As part of this process, it is possible to get individuals to rote learn refutational arguments against future counter-messages. A related tactic here is that of anchoring, which involves connecting the forthcoming new message to an already established belief or set of values. It then becomes difficult to change one without the other. […] Another form of pre-emption has been termed stealing thunder, which involves disclosing incriminating evidence about oneself or one’s client, rather than have this revealed by someone else. […] [Williams and Dolnik’s] review of [the] research concluded that: ‘Stealing thunder has been shown to be an effective method of minimizing the impact of damaging information in a variety of different contexts’”

“Those who are able to administer punishments also have considerable power. […] There is a symbiotic relationship between reward and coercive power. Usually someone who can reward us can ipso facto also punish us (e.g. by withholding the rewards). […] we tend to like those who reward us and dislike those who threaten or punish us.”

“Our behaviour is shaped to a considerable extent by our wish to belong to and be accepted by certain groups of people […] we are likely to adopt the response patterns of those we identify with, like, and to whose group we aspire. […] Referent power is most potent under two conditions. First, if we are uncertain about how to behave in a situation we follow the ‘herd instinct’ by looking to members of our reference group for guidance, and copying what they do. […] Second, we are more likely to be influenced by similar others. […] We are much more likely to be influenced by those with whom we have developed a close relationship. […] As we get to know people our liking for them tends to increase, providing this takes place within a conducive context. Even a few minutes of initial relational communication with a stranger prior to making a persuasion attempt can significantly increase the success rate”

“people who are perceived to be experts, in that they have specialised knowledge or technical skill, have high persuasive power. Here the basis of the power is the extent to which the agent is seen as an authority. […] in terms of expert power we give less credence to those whom we regard as honest if they are incompetent, and tend to have lower trust in those with a vested interest regardless of their level of expertise. One highly influential event is when people argue against their own interest.”

“In terms of delivery of arguments, these are more persuasive when there is a powerful speech style, wherein the person speaks in a firm, authoritative tone and uses intensifiers […] By contrast, a powerless style is characterised by five main features:
1. hesitations (‘Um . . . ah . . .’)
2. hedges or qualifiers (‘I sort of think . . .’, ‘It might possibly be . . .’)
3. disclaimers (‘I don’t have any real knowledge of this area, however . . .’, ‘I might be wrong, but . . .’)
4. tag questions (‘. . . don’t you think?’, ‘. . . isn’t it?’), and statements made with a questioning intonation
5. lower voice volume.

In a review of the area, Durik et al. (2008) concluded ‘that messages with hedges led to less persuasion, more negative perceptions of the source, and weaker evaluations of the argument’. In their meta-analytic review of research in this area, Burrell and Koper (1998) found that a powerful speech pattern was perceived to be more credible and persuasive. Likewise, in their analysis of this field, Holtgraves and Lasky (1999: 196) concluded: ‘A speaker who uses powerless language will be perceived as less assertive, competent, credible, authoritative, and in general evaluated less favorably than a speaker who uses powerful language.’ If uncertainty has to be expressed, a powerful style should employ authoritative doubt, which underlines that the dubiety is from a vantage point of expertise”

“Repetition of arguments has been shown to be effective in increasing their persuasive power […] Statements heard more than once tend to be rated as more valid than those heard for the first time – an effect known as the illusion of truth. […] Song and Schwarz (2010: 111) in their review of research [concluded]: ‘The mere repetition of a statement facilitates its perception as true.’ […] [One] question is whether a speaker should have a clear and explicit conclusion at the end of an argument or leave this implicit and allow the audience to draw it out for themselves […]. The evidence here is clear: ‘Messages with explicit conclusions are more persuasive than those with implicit conclusions’ (O’Keefe, 2006: 334). […] An important decision is whether to use one-sided or two-sided arguments. In other words, should the disadvantages of what is being recommended also be recognised? Research findings show that one-sided messages are best with those who already support the view being expressed. […] When preaching to the converted it is necessary to target the message in a single direction. One-sided messages are also better with those of a lower IQ, who may become confused if presented with seemingly contradictory arguments […] Two-sided arguments are more appropriate with those with a higher IQ.”

“As a core emotion, threatening messages that heighten our sense of fear can be very effective in changing attitudes and behaviour […] In a meta-analysis of research into fear arousal and persuasion, Mongeau (1998: 65) concluded: ‘Overall, increasing the amount of fear-arousing content in a persuasive message is likely to generate greater attitude and behavior change.’ However, he also found that the use of this tactic was not always successful. Fear is more effective with older subjects (i.e. with adults as opposed to schoolchildren) and with low anxiety individuals. With highly anxious people it may backfire, so that the heightened anxiety induced by an intense fear scenario can inhibit attention and increase distraction. This in turn reduces comprehension, or results in the message either being ignored completely or rejected. Thus, if people already have very high levels of fear about a subject, attempting to increase this even further has been shown to be counterproductive”

“Most people are susceptible to appeals to conscience, in the form of reminders that we have a duty to ‘do the right thing’, and that if we do not fulfil our moral obligations we will feel bad about ourselves. […] In his review of the area, O’Keefe (2006) [however] noted that guilt may backfire in that it may cause the target not to change their behaviour in line with previous attitudes and beliefs, but instead to change those attitudes and beliefs to be consistent with the new behaviour. O’Keefe also illustrated that while more explicit guilt appeals do induce greater guilt, less explicit guilt appeals are actually more effective in changing behaviour. The reason for this seems to be that more explicit guilt appeals induce greater resentment or anger in the target, and this tempers the success of the appeal. […] Since we do not like to be made to feel guilty, we tend to dislike the person who has caused this to occur, and we are then more likely to avoid them in future.”

 

 

 

August 19, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment

Meta

This is just a brief administrative note: I’ll have very limited, if any, access to the internet and this blog during the next week.

I have written a few posts which I have scheduled to be published during my absence, so the blog will still be updated in the week to come – at least if I’ve set it up correctly; I don’t have a lot of experience with scheduling posts.

I shall however be unable to read and approve comments during the next week: If a comment happens to get caught by the spamfilter I’ll not know about it, and if you decide to ask me a question I’ll not be able to answer it until I get back. You’re very welcome to comment and ask questions anyway.

August 17, 2014 Posted by | meta | Leave a comment

Wikipedia articles of interest

i. Dodo (featured article).

“The dodo (Raphus cucullatus) is an extinct flightless bird that was endemic to the island of Mauritius, east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Its closest genetic relative was the also extinct Rodrigues solitaire, the two forming the subfamily Raphinae of the family of pigeons and doves. […] Subfossil remains show the dodo was about 1 metre (3.3 feet) tall and may have weighed 10–18 kg (22–40 lb) in the wild. The dodo’s appearance in life is evidenced only by drawings, paintings and written accounts from the 17th century. Because these vary considerably, and because only some illustrations are known to have been drawn from live specimens, its exact appearance in life remains unresolved. Similarly, little is known with certainty about its habitat and behaviour.”

“The first recorded mention of the dodo was by Dutch sailors in 1598. In the following years, the bird was hunted by sailors, their domesticated animals, and invasive species introduced during that time. The last widely accepted sighting of a dodo was in 1662. Its extinction was not immediately noticed, and some considered it to be a mythical creature. In the 19th century, research was conducted on a small quantity of remains of four specimens that had been brought to Europe in the early 17th century. Among these is a dried head, the only soft tissue of the dodo that remains today. Since then, a large amount of subfossil material has been collected from Mauritius […] The dodo was anatomically similar to pigeons in many features. […] The dodo differed from other pigeons mainly in the small size of the wings and the large size of the beak in proportion to the rest of the cranium. […] Many of the skeletal features that distinguish the dodo and the Rodrigues solitaire, its closest relative, from pigeons have been attributed to their flightlessness. […] The lack of mammalian herbivores competing for resources on these islands allowed the solitaire and the dodo to attain very large sizes.[19]” [If the last sentence sparked your interest and/or might be something about which you’d like to know more, I have previously covered a great book on related topics here on the blog]

“The etymology of the word dodo is unclear. Some ascribe it to the Dutch word dodoor for “sluggard”, but it is more probably related to Dodaars, which means either “fat-arse” or “knot-arse”, referring to the knot of feathers on the hind end. […] The traditional image of the dodo is of a very fat and clumsy bird, but this view may be exaggerated. The general opinion of scientists today is that many old European depictions were based on overfed captive birds or crudely stuffed specimens.[44]

“Like many animals that evolved in isolation from significant predators, the dodo was entirely fearless of humans. This fearlessness and its inability to fly made the dodo easy prey for sailors.[79] Although some scattered reports describe mass killings of dodos for ships’ provisions, archaeological investigations have found scant evidence of human predation. […] The human population on Mauritius (an area of 1,860 km2 or 720 sq mi) never exceeded 50 people in the 17th century, but they introduced other animals, including dogs, pigs, cats, rats, and crab-eating macaques, which plundered dodo nests and competed for the limited food resources.[37] At the same time, humans destroyed the dodo’s forest habitat. The impact of these introduced animals, especially the pigs and macaques, on the dodo population is currently considered more severe than that of hunting. […] Even though the rareness of the dodo was reported already in the 17th century, its extinction was not recognised until the 19th century. This was partly because, for religious reasons, extinction was not believed possible until later proved so by Georges Cuvier, and partly because many scientists doubted that the dodo had ever existed. It seemed altogether too strange a creature, and many believed it a myth.”

Some of the contemporary accounts and illustrations included in the article, from which behavioural patterns etc. have been inferred, I found quite depressing. Two illustrative quotes and a contemporary engraving are included below:

“Blue parrots are very numerous there, as well as other birds; among which are a kind, conspicuous for their size, larger than our swans, with huge heads only half covered with skin as if clothed with a hood. […] These we used to call ‘Walghvogel’, for the reason that the longer and oftener they were cooked, the less soft and more insipid eating they became. Nevertheless their belly and breast were of a pleasant flavour and easily masticated.[40]

“I have seen in Mauritius birds bigger than a Swan, without feathers on the body, which is covered with a black down; the hinder part is round, the rump adorned with curled feathers as many in number as the bird is years old. […] We call them Oiseaux de Nazaret. The fat is excellent to give ease to the muscles and nerves.[7]

640px-Jacht_op_dodo's_door_Willem_van_West-Zanen_uit_1602

ii. Armero tragedy (featured).

“The Armero tragedy […] was one of the major consequences of the eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz stratovolcano in Tolima, Colombia, on November 13, 1985. After 69 years of dormancy, the volcano’s eruption caught nearby towns unaware, even though the government had received warnings from multiple volcanological organizations to evacuate the area when volcanic activity had been detected in September 1985.[1]

As pyroclastic flows erupted from the volcano’s crater, they melted the mountain’s glaciers, sending four enormous lahars (volcanically induced mudslides, landslides, and debris flows) down its slopes at 50 kilometers per hour (30 miles per hour). The lahars picked up speed in gullies and coursed into the six major rivers at the base of the volcano; they engulfed the town of Armero, killing more than 20,000 of its almost 29,000 inhabitants.[2] Casualties in other towns, particularly Chinchiná, brought the overall death toll to 23,000. […] The relief efforts were hindered by the composition of the mud, which made it nearly impossible to move through without becoming stuck. By the time relief workers reached Armero twelve hours after the eruption, many of the victims with serious injuries were dead. The relief workers were horrified by the landscape of fallen trees, disfigured human bodies, and piles of debris from entire houses. […] The event was a foreseeable catastrophe exacerbated by the populace’s unawareness of the volcano’s destructive history; geologists and other experts had warned authorities and media outlets about the danger over the weeks and days leading up to the eruption.”

“The day of the eruption, black ash columns erupted from the volcano at approximately 3:00 pm local time. The local Civil Defense director was promptly alerted to the situation. He contacted INGEOMINAS, which ruled that the area should be evacuated; he was then told to contact the Civil Defense directors in Bogotá and Tolima. Between 5:00 and 7:00 pm, the ash stopped falling, and local officials instructed people to “stay calm” and go inside. Around 5:00 pm an emergency committee meeting was called, and when it ended at 7:00 pm, several members contacted the regional Red Cross over the intended evacuation efforts at Armero, Mariquita, and Honda. The Ibagué Red Cross contacted Armero’s officials and ordered an evacuation, which was not carried out because of electrical problems caused by a storm. The storm’s heavy rain and constant thunder may have overpowered the noise of the volcano, and with no systematic warning efforts, the residents of Armero were completely unaware of the continuing activity at Ruiz. At 9:45 pm, after the volcano had erupted, Civil Defense officials from Ibagué and Murillo tried to warn Armero’s officials, but could not make contact. Later they overheard conversations between individual officials of Armero and others; famously, a few heard the Mayor of Armero speaking on a ham radio, saying “that he did not think there was much danger”, when he was overtaken by the lahar.[20]

“The lahars, formed of water, ice, pumice, and other rocks,[25] incorporated clay from eroding soil as they traveled down the volcano’s flanks.[26] They ran down the volcano’s sides at an average speed of 60 kilometers (40 mi) per hour, dislodging rock and destroying vegetation. After descending thousands of meters down the side of the volcano, the lahars followed the six river valleys leading from the volcano, where they grew to almost four times their original volume. In the Gualí River, a lahar reached a maximum width of 50 meters (160 ft).[25]

Survivors in Armero described the night as “quiet”. Volcanic ash had been falling throughout the day, but residents were informed it was nothing to worry about. Later in the afternoon, ash began falling again after a long period of quiet. Local radio stations reported that residents should remain calm and ignore the material. One survivor reported going to the fire department to be informed that the ash was “nothing”.[27] […] At 11:30 pm, the first lahar hit, followed shortly by the others.[28] One of the lahars virtually erased Armero; three-quarters of its 28,700 inhabitants were killed.[25] Proceeding in three major waves, this lahar was 30 meters (100 ft) deep, moved at 12 meters per second (39 ft/s), and lasted ten to twenty minutes. Traveling at about 6 meters (20 ft) per second, the second lahar lasted thirty minutes and was followed by smaller pulses. A third major pulse brought the lahar’s duration to roughly two hours; by that point, 85 percent of Armero was enveloped in mud. Survivors described people holding on to debris from their homes in attempts to stay above the mud. Buildings collapsed, crushing people and raining down debris. The front of the lahar contained boulders and cobbles which would have crushed anyone in their path, while the slower parts were dotted by fine, sharp stones which caused lacerations. Mud moved into open wounds and other open body parts – the eyes, ears, and mouth – and placed pressure capable of inducing traumatic asphyxia in one or two minutes upon people buried in it.”

“The volcano continues to pose a serious threat to nearby towns and villages. Of the threats, the one with the most potential for danger is that of small-volume eruptions, which can destabilize glaciers and trigger lahars.[51] Although much of the volcano’s glacier mass has retreated, a significant volume of ice still sits atop Nevado del Ruiz and other volcanoes in the Ruiz–Tolima massif. Melting just 10 percent of the ice would produce lahars with a volume of up to 200 million cubic meters – similar to the lahar that destroyed Armero in 1985. In just hours, these lahars can travel up to 100 km along river valleys.[33] Estimates show that up to 500,000 people living in the Combeima, Chinchina, Coello-Toche, and Guali valleys are at risk, with 100,000 individuals being considered to be at high risk.”

iii. Asteroid belt (featured).

“The asteroid belt is the region of the Solar System located roughly between the orbits of the planets Mars and Jupiter. It is occupied by numerous irregularly shaped bodies called asteroids or minor planets. The asteroid belt is also termed the main asteroid belt or main belt to distinguish its members from other asteroids in the Solar System such as near-Earth asteroids and trojan asteroids. About half the mass of the belt is contained in the four largest asteroids, Ceres, Vesta, Pallas, and Hygiea. Vesta, Pallas, and Hygiea have mean diameters of more than 400 km, whereas Ceres, the asteroid belt’s only dwarf planet, is about 950 km in diameter.[1][2][3][4] The remaining bodies range down to the size of a dust particle.”

“The asteroid belt formed from the primordial solar nebula as a group of planetesimals, the smaller precursors of the planets, which in turn formed protoplanets. Between Mars and Jupiter, however, gravitational perturbations from Jupiter imbued the protoplanets with too much orbital energy for them to accrete into a planet. Collisions became too violent, and instead of fusing together, the planetesimals and most of the protoplanets shattered. As a result, 99.9% of the asteroid belt’s original mass was lost in the first 100 million years of the Solar System’s history.[5]

“In an anonymous footnote to his 1766 translation of Charles Bonnet‘s Contemplation de la Nature,[8] the astronomer Johann Daniel Titius of Wittenberg[9][10] noted an apparent pattern in the layout of the planets. If one began a numerical sequence at 0, then included 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, etc., doubling each time, and added four to each number and divided by 10, this produced a remarkably close approximation to the radii of the orbits of the known planets as measured in astronomical units. This pattern, now known as the Titius–Bode law, predicted the semi-major axes of the six planets of the time (Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) provided one allowed for a “gap” between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. […] On January 1, 1801, Giuseppe Piazzi, Chair of Astronomy at the University of Palermo, Sicily, found a tiny moving object in an orbit with exactly the radius predicted by the Titius–Bode law. He dubbed it Ceres, after the Roman goddess of the harvest and patron of Sicily. Piazzi initially believed it a comet, but its lack of a coma suggested it was a planet.[12] Fifteen months later, Heinrich Wilhelm Olbers discovered a second object in the same region, Pallas. Unlike the other known planets, the objects remained points of light even under the highest telescope magnifications instead of resolving into discs. Apart from their rapid movement, they appeared indistinguishable from stars. Accordingly, in 1802 William Herschel suggested they be placed into a separate category, named asteroids, after the Greek asteroeides, meaning “star-like”. […] The discovery of Neptune in 1846 led to the discrediting of the Titius–Bode law in the eyes of scientists, because its orbit was nowhere near the predicted position. […] One hundred asteroids had been located by mid-1868, and in 1891 the introduction of astrophotography by Max Wolf accelerated the rate of discovery still further.[22] A total of 1,000 asteroids had been found by 1921,[23] 10,000 by 1981,[24] and 100,000 by 2000.[25] Modern asteroid survey systems now use automated means to locate new minor planets in ever-increasing quantities.”

“In 1802, shortly after discovering Pallas, Heinrich Olbers suggested to William Herschel that Ceres and Pallas were fragments of a much larger planet that once occupied the Mars–Jupiter region, this planet having suffered an internal explosion or a cometary impact many million years before.[26] Over time, however, this hypothesis has fallen from favor. […] Today, most scientists accept that, rather than fragmenting from a progenitor planet, the asteroids never formed a planet at all. […] The asteroids are not samples of the primordial Solar System. They have undergone considerable evolution since their formation, including internal heating (in the first few tens of millions of years), surface melting from impacts, space weathering from radiation, and bombardment by micrometeorites.[34] […] collisions between asteroids occur frequently (on astronomical time scales). Collisions between main-belt bodies with a mean radius of 10 km are expected to occur about once every 10 million years.[63] A collision may fragment an asteroid into numerous smaller pieces (leading to the formation of a new asteroid family). Conversely, collisions that occur at low relative speeds may also join two asteroids. After more than 4 billion years of such processes, the members of the asteroid belt now bear little resemblance to the original population. […] The current asteroid belt is believed to contain only a small fraction of the mass of the primordial belt. Computer simulations suggest that the original asteroid belt may have contained mass equivalent to the Earth.[37] Primarily because of gravitational perturbations, most of the material was ejected from the belt within about a million years of formation, leaving behind less than 0.1% of the original mass.[29] Since their formation, the size distribution of the asteroid belt has remained relatively stable: there has been no significant increase or decrease in the typical dimensions of the main-belt asteroids.[38]

“Contrary to popular imagery, the asteroid belt is mostly empty. The asteroids are spread over such a large volume that it would be improbable to reach an asteroid without aiming carefully. Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of asteroids are currently known, and the total number ranges in the millions or more, depending on the lower size cutoff. Over 200 asteroids are known to be larger than 100 km,[44] and a survey in the infrared wavelengths has shown that the asteroid belt has 0.7–1.7 million asteroids with a diameter of 1 km or more. […] The total mass of the asteroid belt is estimated to be 2.8×1021 to 3.2×1021 kilograms, which is just 4% of the mass of the Moon.[2] […] Several otherwise unremarkable bodies in the outer belt show cometary activity. Because their orbits cannot be explained through capture of classical comets, it is thought that many of the outer asteroids may be icy, with the ice occasionally exposed to sublimation through small impacts. Main-belt comets may have been a major source of the Earth’s oceans, because the deuterium–hydrogen ratio is too low for classical comets to have been the principal source.[56] […] Of the 50,000 meteorites found on Earth to date, 99.8 percent are believed to have originated in the asteroid belt.[67]

iv. Series (mathematics). This article has a lot of stuff, including lots of links to other stuff.

v. Occupation of Japan. Interesting article, I haven’t really read very much about this before. Some quotes:

“At the head of the Occupation administration was General MacArthur who was technically supposed to defer to an advisory council set up by the Allied powers, but in practice did everything himself. As a result, this period was one of significant American influence […] MacArthur’s first priority was to set up a food distribution network; following the collapse of the ruling government and the wholesale destruction of most major cities, virtually everyone was starving. Even with these measures, millions of people were still on the brink of starvation for several years after the surrender.”

“By the end of 1945, more than 350,000 U.S. personnel were stationed throughout Japan. By the beginning of 1946, replacement troops began to arrive in the country in large numbers and were assigned to MacArthur’s Eighth Army, headquartered in Tokyo’s Dai-Ichi building. Of the main Japanese islands, Kyūshū was occupied by the 24th Infantry Division, with some responsibility for Shikoku. Honshū was occupied by the First Cavalry Division. Hokkaido was occupied by the 11th Airborne Division.

By June 1950, all these army units had suffered extensive troop reductions and their combat effectiveness was seriously weakened. When North Korea invaded South Korea (see Korean War), elements of the 24th Division were flown into South Korea to try to stem the massive invasion force there, but the green occupation troops, while acquitting themselves well when suddenly thrown into combat almost overnight, suffered heavy casualties and were forced into retreat until other Japan occupation troops could be sent to assist.”

“During the Occupation, GHQ/SCAP mostly abolished many of the financial coalitions known as the Zaibatsu, which had previously monopolized industry.[20] […] A major land reform was also conducted […] Between 1947 and 1949, approximately 5,800,000 acres (23,000 km2) of land (approximately 38% of Japan’s cultivated land) were purchased from the landlords under the government’s reform program and resold at extremely low prices (after inflation) to the farmers who worked them. By 1950, three million peasants had acquired land, dismantling a power structure that the landlords had long dominated.[22]

“There are allegations that during the three months in 1945 when Okinawa was gradually occupied there were rapes committed by U.S. troops. According to some accounts, US troops committed thousands of rapes during the campaign.[36][37]

Many Japanese civilians in the Japanese mainland feared that the Allied occupation troops were likely to rape Japanese women. The Japanese authorities set up a large system of prostitution facilities (RAA) in order to protect the population. […] However, there was a resulting large rise in venereal disease among the soldiers, which led MacArthur to close down the prostitution in early 1946.[39] The incidence of rape increased after the closure of the brothels, possibly eight-fold; […] “According to one calculation the number of rapes and assaults on Japanese women amounted to around 40 daily while the RAA was in operation, and then rose to an average of 330 a day after it was terminated in early 1946.”[40] Michael S. Molasky states that while rape and other violent crime was widespread in naval ports like Yokosuka and Yokohama during the first few weeks of occupation, according to Japanese police reports and journalistic studies, the number of incidents declined shortly after and were not common on mainland Japan throughout the rest of occupation.[41] Two weeks into the occupation, the Occupation administration began censoring all media. This included any mention of rape or other sensitive social issues.”

“Post-war Japan was chaotic. The air raids on Japan’s urban centers left millions displaced and food shortages, created by bad harvests and the demands of the war, worsened when the seizure of food from Korea, Taiwan, and China ceased.[58] Repatriation of Japanese living in other parts of Asia only aggravated the problems in Japan as these displaced people put more strain on already scarce resources. Over 5.1 million Japanese returned to Japan in the fifteen months following October 1, 1945.[59] Alcohol and drug abuse became major problems. Deep exhaustion, declining morale and despair were so widespread that it was termed the “kyodatsu condition” (虚脱状態 kyodatsujoutai?, lit. “state of lethargy”).[60] Inflation was rampant and many people turned to the black market for even the most basic goods. These black markets in turn were often places of turf wars between rival gangs, like the Shibuya incident in 1946.”

August 16, 2014 Posted by | Astronomy, Biology, Ecology, Evolutionary biology, Geology, History, Mathematics, Wikipedia, Zoology | Leave a comment

Social skills… (listening, explaining, self-disclosure)

I have finished Hargie’s book. I don’t have a lot of stuff to say about the book which I haven’t already said, aside perhaps from the fact that the book actually, partly on account of its high page count, does have a lot of stuff which I feel tempted to cover here. I should note that I feel tempted to cover it here not only because it’s interesting, but also to a significant extent because I know this is one of those books I’ll never open/touch/whatever again, so the stuff I decide not to blog is stuff which I’m sure will be forgot. The first two posts dealt with roughly the first 200 pages, so there’s still a lot of stuff left to talk about. You can expect me to post at least one or two more posts about the stuff covered in the book in the days to come.

In this post I’ve covered material from the chapters on the skill of listening, the skill of explaining (very little, this was a bad chapter), and the skill of self-disclosure.

“One recurring problem is that we often listen with the goal of responding, rather than listening with the goal of understanding […] our main concern is with our own point of view rather than with gaining a deeper insight into the other person’s perspective.”

“In interpersonal interaction a constant stream of feedback impinges upon us, both from the stimuli received from other people and from the physical environment. Not all of this feedback is consciously perceived, since there is simply too much information for the person to cope with adequately. As a result, a selective perception filter […] is operative, and its main function is to filter only a limited amount of information into the conscious, while some of the remainder may be stored at a subconscious level. […] Unfortunately, in interpersonal interaction, vital information can be filtered out, in that we may be insensitive to the social signals emitted by others. Where this occurs, effective listening skills are not displayed. […] As we talk, at the same time we also scan for feedback to see how our messages are being received. When we listen, we evaluate what is being said, plan our response, rehearse this and then execute it. While the processes of evaluation, planning and rehearsal usually occur subconsciously, they are important because they can interfere with the pure listening activity. Thus, we may have decided what we are going to say before the other person has stopped speaking, and as a result may not be listening effectively. It is therefore important to ensure that those activities that mediate between listening and speaking do not interfere with the listening process itself.”

“We evaluate others based on their appearance, initial statements or what they said during previous encounters. These influence the way the speaker is heard, in that statements may be screened so that only those aspects that fit with specific expectations are perceived.”

“Those with a wider vocabulary are better listeners, since they can more readily understand and assimilate a greater range of concepts. […] A listener who is highly motivated will remember more of the information presented. […] Listening ability deteriorates as fatigue increases. Thus, someone who is extremely tired is less capable of displaying prolonged listening. […] Introverts are usually better listeners than extraverts, since they are content to sit back and let the other person be the centre of attention. Furthermore, highly anxious individuals do not usually make good listeners since they tend to be too worried about factors apart from the speaker to listen carefully to what is being said.”

“The differential between speech and thought rate gives the listener an opportunity to assimilate, organise, retain and covertly respond to the speaker. However, this differential may also encourage the listener to fill up the spare time with other unrelated mental processes (such as daydreaming). Listening can be improved by using this spare thought time positively by, for example, asking covert questions such as:
• ‘What are the main points being made?’
• ‘What reasons are being given?’
• ‘In what frame of reference should this be viewed?’
• ‘What further information is necessary?’
Where a speaker exceeds 300 words per minute, listening can be problematic. It is difficult to listen effectively for an extended period to a very rapid speaker, since we cannot handle the volume of information being received. […] The clarity, fluency and audibility of the speaker all have an influence on listener comprehension.”

“If the speaker displays high levels of emotion, the listener may be distracted by this and cease to listen accurately to the content of the verbal message. In situations where individuals are in extreme emotional states, their communication is inevitably highly charged. […] When faced with a person experiencing extreme emotions […] it is often not advisable either to reinforce positively or to rebuke the individual for this behaviour, since such reactions may well be counterproductive. […] A more reasoned response is to react in a calm fashion, demonstrating an interest in, without overtly reinforcing, the emotional person, but also showing a willingness to listen and attempt to understand what exactly has caused this to occur. Only when strong emotional feelings begin to decrease can a more rational discussion take place.”

“If the speaker is regarded as an important person, or a recognised authority on a topic, listening comprehension is increased as more credence will be attached to what is being said. Also, more attention tends to be paid if the speaker is in a position of superiority. Attention is therefore greater if the listener has admiration and respect for a speaker of high credibility. […] when the message conveys similar values, attitudes or viewpoints to our own, listening is facilitated […] Effective listening is facilitated by paying attention to only one person at a time, and by manipulating the environment in order to ensure that extraneous distractions are minimised […] If someone is expected to listen for a prolonged period, […] comfortable seating has been shown to be an important factor for listening effectiveness […] In group contexts, a compact seating arrangement is more effective than a scattered one. People pay more attention and recall more when they are brought close together physically, as opposed to when they are spread out around the room.”

“Someone who is self-conscious, and concerned with the personal impression being conveyed, is unlikely to be listening closely to others. In terms of research into memory, two identified problems relate to the process of inhibition […]. Proactive inhibition occurs when something that has already been learned interferes with attempts to learn new material. A parallel problem is retroactive inhibition, which is where material that has already been learned is impaired as a result of the impact of, and interference from, recent material. In interpersonal encounters inhibition also occurs. Retroactive listening inhibition is where the individual is still pondering over the ramifications of something that happened in the recent past, at the expense of listening to the speaker in the present interaction. Proactive listening inhibition takes place when someone has an important engagement looming, and a preoccupation with this militates against listening in the present. The main mental focus then tends to be more about how to handle the future encounter than about what the speaker is currently saying.”

“Research has shown that speakers want listeners to respond appropriately to what they are saying rather than to ‘just listen’ […]. In other words, they desire active listening in the form of both verbal and nonverbal behaviours. Active listening requires concerted effort and attention […], as it involves showing that we have both heard and understood what the other person has communicated […] When the listener shows warmth and enthusiasm for what we are saying, this attitude influences us and so we are likely to become more expressive and expansive. By contrast, when the listener is cold and formal, we are more likely to provide basic, factual responses. Although verbal responses are the main indicators of successful listening, if accompanying nonverbal behaviours are not displayed it is usually assumed that an individual is not paying attention, and ipso facto not listening. Thus, while these nonverbal signs may not be crucial to the assimilation of verbal messages, they are expected by others.”

“[One] aspect of reinforcement that is a potent indicator of effective listening is reference to past statements. This can range from simply remembering someone’s name to remembering other details about facts, feelings or ideas they may have expressed in the past. This shows a willingness to pay attention to what was previously discussed and in turn is likely to encourage the person to participate more fully in the present interaction.”

“[Some] nonverbal cues have been identified as signs of inattentiveness or lack of listening […] The most common of these are: • inappropriate facial expressions • lack of eye contact • poor use of paralanguage (e.g. flat tone of voice, no emphasis) • slouched or shifting posture • absence of head nods • the use of distracting behaviours (e.g. rubbing the eyes, yawning, writing or reading while the speaker is talking). […] These nonverbal signals can of course be deceiving, in that someone who is assimilating the verbal message may not appear to be listening. […] Conversely, people may engage in pretend listening, or pseudo-listening, where they show all of the overt signs of attending but are not actually listening at all […] both the verbal and nonverbal determinants of active listening play a key role in social interaction. In fact, these signs are integrated in such a fashion that, in most cases, if either channel signals lack of attention this is taken as an overall indication of poor listening. […] It is important to realise that listening is not something that just happens, but rather is an active process in which the listener decides to pay careful attention to the speaker.”

“An explanation may be triggered by a direct request from someone who needs or wants to know something. Alternatively it may be the explainer who initiates the exchange. In the latter case, an important first step may be to create a ‘felt need’ on the part of recipients. They should have a sense that listening to what is about to be said will be worthwhile […] An explanation that carries more detail than is necessary is just as defective as one that does not carry enough – a key feature of effective explanations is that they are succinct […] One of the causes of punctuating speech with sounds such as ‘eh’ or ‘mm’ is trying to put too many ideas or facts across in one sentence. It is better to use reasonably short crisp sentences, with pauses in between, than long rambling ones full of subordinate clauses. This will generally tend to eliminate speech hesitancies. Another cause of dysfluency is lack of adequate planning and forethought. […] Pausing briefly to collect and organise thought processes before embarking on an explanation can […] facilitate fluent speech patterns. Added to that, planned pausing can help to increase understanding of the explanation.”

“When two people meet for the first time, it is more likely that they will focus upon factual disclosures (name, occupation, place of residence) while keeping any feeling disclosures at a fairly superficial level (‘I hate crowded parties’, ‘I like rock music’). This is largely because the expression of personal feelings involves greater risk and places the discloser in a more vulnerable position. […] A gradual progression from low to high levels of self-disclosure leads to better relationship development. […] Factual and feeling disclosures at a deeper level can be regarded as a sign of commitment to a relationship.”

“A self-disclosure can be about one’s own personal experience, or it can be about one’s personal reaction to the experiences being related by another […] If the objective is to give concerted attention to an individual and encourage full disclosure, then concentrating upon one’s reactions to the feelings or thoughts of the other person would be most appropriate. If, however, the intention is to demonstrate that the person’s feelings are not unusual, then the use of a parallel self-disclosure relating one’s own experience would be more apposite.”

“[Valence] is the degree to which the disclosure is positive or negative for both discloser and listener. In the early stages of relationship development, disclosures are mainly positive, and negative self-disclosures usually only emerge once a relationship has been established. […] Negative self-disclosures have been shown to be marked by paralinguistic cues such as stuttering, stammering, repetition, mumbling and low ‘feeble’ voice quality, whereas positive disclosures tend to be characterised by rapid, flowing, melodious speech […] we expect others to make positive self-disclosures and so we become more alert upon receiving a negative disclosure. […] negative information is attributed as possessing greater relevance than positive information (Yoo, 2009). Thus, the comparative rarity of negative disclosures, and their greater inferential power, mean that we need to use them with caution. […] the use of negative disclosures tends to lead to more negative evaluations of the discloser. […] While the continuous and indiscriminant use of negative self-disclosure is dysfunctional, the judicious application of such disclosures can actually facilitate relational development. […] negative emotions should be expressed to those with whom one has a relationship, the depth of disclosed emotional state should be concomitant with the level of friendship, and the intensity of the disclosure should reflect the degree of emotional need. Given these parameters, Graham et al. showed that the disclosure of appropriate negative emotions increased ratings of likability, elicited offers of help and increased the level of relational intimacy.”

“Where there is a high degree of asymmetry in status, disclosure tends to be in one direction […] workers may disclose personal problems to their supervisors, but the reverse does not usually happen. This is because for a supervisor to disclose personal information to a subordinate would cause a loss of face, which would affect the status relationship. Research findings tend to suggest that self-disclosures are most often employed between people of equal status […] There would seem to be a relationship between psychological adjustment and self-disclosure in that individuals who are extremely high or low disclosers are regarded as less socially skilled.”

“Often, before we make a deep disclosure, there is a strategic process of testing […] or advance pre-testing […], whereby we ‘trail’ the topic with potential confidants and observe their reactions. If these are favourable, then we continue with the revelations; if not, we move on to a new topic. However, the initial dangers of self-disclosure are such that we expect an equal commitment to this process from people with whom we may wish to develop a relationship […]. For this reason, reciprocation is expected in the early stages of everyday interaction. […] a person’s disclosure increases the likelihood that the other party will also disclose. In everyday interaction, reciprocation of self-disclosures is the norm. […] It is interesting to note that when people are not able to utilise interpersonal channels for disclosure, they often use substitutes such as keeping a personal diary, talking to a pet or conversing with God. Indeed, this need can be observed at an early stage in young children who often disclose to a teddy bear or doll.”

“People who do not have access to a good listener may not only be denied the opportunity to heighten their self-awareness, but they are also denied valuable feedback as to the validity and acceptability of their inner thoughts and feelings. By discussing these with others, we receive feedback as to whether these are experiences which others have as well, or whether they are less common. Furthermore, by gauging the reactions to our self-disclosures we learn what types are acceptable or unacceptable with particular people and in specific situations. […] The appropriate use of self-disclosure is crucial to the development and maintenance of long-term relationships […]. Those who disclose either too much or too little tend to have problems in establishing and sustaining relationships.”

“In their metaanalysis of research studies into gender differences in adults’ language use, Leaper and Ayres (2007) found that women used more self-disclosures than men. Dindia (2000b), in an earlier meta-analytical study, also found that females disclosed more than males, but this was moderated by the gender of the recipient, so that:
• females do not disclose to males any more than males do to males
• females disclose more to females than males do to males
• females disclose more to females than males do to females
• females disclose more to males than males do to females.”

“Personality variables have been shown to relate to disclosure level […]. Shy, introverted types, those with low self-esteem and individuals with a high need for social approval disclose less, and social desirability is negatively related to depth of disclosure. Also those with an external locus of control […] disclose less than those with an internal locus of control […]. Lonely individuals have also been found to disclose less […] Accepting/empathic people receive more disclosures. […] ‘We like people who self-disclose to us, we disclose more to people we like, and we like others as a result of having disclosed to them’ […] more self-disclosures tend to be made to individuals who are perceived as being similar (in attitudes, values, beliefs, etc.)”

“Solano and Dunnam (1985) showed that self-disclosure was greater in dyads than in triads, which in turn was greater than in a four-person group. They further found that this reduction applied regardless of the gender of the interactors and concluded that there may well be a linear decrease in self-disclosure as group size increases.”

August 14, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment

Skilled nonverbal behaviour, reinforcement, questioning…

I’ve been reading Hargie. I’ve now roughly read two-thirds of the book, it’s quite long (the pdf version has 629 pages). In the first part of this post I have added some general comments and observations I’ve made along the way so far while reading the book, and in the second part of the post I have covered some specific topics also covered in the book.

First off, the book has made it easier for me to understand the hostility some ‘hard scientists’ display towards what they like to call the social ‘sciences’. Some of the stuff in this book is horrible. In a way it has been nice to spend a bit of time with the sort of research that really gives social science a bad name; I’ve encountered some of that research before while doing work on psychology, but some of the stuff included here really takes the cake. Not all of it is useless or terrible, but there’s no argument that some of it is, and so while you’re reading about results from the book – I don’t suggest you actually read the book – you need to take some of them with a grain of salt or two. Or five. Even if I’ve tried to shy away from the worst of it.

An observation I was reminded of along the way was that whereas reporting the results of studies on a topic may in some contexts serve to indicate to others that you’re a Man Of Science and that you Really Know What You’re Talking About, it may also in other contexts do nothing of the sort, and in some specific contexts such activities may even completely undermine all trust other people might have in your ability to make judgments on such matters (on reflection I realize now that it seems almost certain that some of my posts on this blog in the past have had this effect on people reading along, in part because I don’t always make clear when I’m skeptical about specific findings because explicitly expressing skepticism in a specific context takes a lot more work than does the alternative – oh, well…). Some of Hargie’s coverage basically only served to convince me that I couldn’t trust his views on the science in these contexts, because of the way he talked about the results. Here’s an example:

“As discussed in Chapter 3, in reality deceit is not always so easy to detect. In fact, research has consistently shown that people are on average only 47 per cent accurate in detecting deception – that is less than chance.” (p. 250)

“Research has consistently shown that people are on average only 47 per cent accurate”. Yep, he actually wrote that. Research has consistently given the number 47 per cent, according to Hargie. I’m not convinced at this point that the author even knows what a standard deviation is. On a reasonably closely related note to the quote above, in my first post about the book I noted that Hargie had some obvious holes in his knowledge because it was clear to me that he hadn’t read Aureli et al. (nor the related literature on primatology/ethology). In later chapters it also turns out to be obvious that he’s never read Funder’s book, as some of the details there are simply missing from this coverage – important details, I might add, which I sort of hope Funder isn’t the only one who’s talked about. Along the same vein, some of the coverage of the attractiveness variable in the book would likely also have been better had the author read Bobbi Low, as a few of the results reported seem questionable given the coverage there.

I figured beforehand that I should read a book like this because it covers stuff which may well be useful for someone like me to know. An interesting observation I have made is that it turns out I might actually be quite a lot better at some of the aspects which relate to social interaction and communication than I’d imagined (though note that this observation does not really relate to anything covered in this post), even if some other aspects covered in this book do without doubt cause me serious trouble. I can justify reading on because good books on topics such as these are really hard to come by – most books dealing with topics like these are presumably self-help books, and I’m not reading those – and because some of the stuff really is not all that terrible, perhaps even quite useful. There’s enough semi-useful stuff mixed in with the crap for now to justify me reading on, though I’ve been close to just saying ‘enough’ more than once. I should note that the way I see it,  by covering the book here I’m doing people reading along a major favour, as it’s my intention only to deal with the reasonably useful stuff in the post below and in the posts to come, meaning that you don’t need to go through all the crap as well. I figure that if I were to cover the bad stuff in detail, all I’d be doing would be venting and fueling my anger at the author, and I see no reason to go down that road as it would likely be counterproductive in terms of actually learning stuff from the book. I think I’ll probably give the book 1 star on goodreads once I’ve finished it because I dislike the way it is written, but I do plan to finish it. I’d like to learn more about social skills, including communication skills, in order to get better at figuring out how to improve them, and the way I usually go about learning stuff about an area about which I don’t know a great deal is to read a book on the topic. Well, this is the sort of book which is available here, so that’s what I’ve got to work with – and I feel like I have to try to make it work.

But it’s occasionally really hard to keep reading. The best way to illustrate which kind of book this is is perhaps by including this observation: The author mentions Star Trek in this textbook. He uses it as a lever to talk about cultural developments in the 60es. Frankly I think students who are forced to use this textbook in class should demand that their universities fire the incompetent clowns who decided that it would be a good idea to use this textbook in class (before switching course/major – seriously, if this book is a good example of the kinds of teaching materials on offer in this field, those students should be running for the hills).

With all that stuff out of the way, I have included some of the reasons why I kept reading anyway below. First I’ll cover a few details from the chapter on nonverbal communication which I did not get to talk about in my first post about the book, and then I’ll move on to cover some stuff from the chapter on reinforcement and the chapter about how to go about asking questions.

“Interactors of equal status tend to take up a closer distance than those of unequal status (Zahn, 1991). In fact, where a status differential exists, lower-status individuals will typically permit those of higher status to approach more closely than they would feel privileged to do. As the topic of conversation shifts to become more intimate than is comfortable for the other, that person may increase distance. Interpersonal distance is, therefore, part of [the] dynamic of nonverbal cues, including gaze and orientation, serving to regulate levels of intimacy and involvement.”

“Judge and Cable (2004) found that in the US workplace those who were six feet tall could expect to earn $166,000 more over a 30-year career span than those who were seven inches shorter. Similarly, Case and Paxson (2008) showed that in both the US and UK for every additional 10 centimetre (4 inches) height advantage, males earned between 4 to 10 per cent more, and females between 5 and 8 per cent more. […] in a large Australian study […] Kortt and Leigh (2010) [found that] a 10-centimetre increase in height was linked to a 3 per cent increase in pay for men, and a 2 per cent increase for women.”

“Mean amplitude (associated closely with loudness) and the extent to which amplitude varies around a mean value have been shown to be positively related to perceived dominance of the speaker (Tusing and Dillard, 2000). Speech rate, on the other hand, was negatively associated (i.e. the faster the rate, the lower the estimation of dominance). Anxiety is an emotional state likely to produce speech errors (Knapp and Hall, 2010).”

In broad terms […] NVC [Non-Verbal Communication] compared to language tends to rely less on a symbolic code, is often represented in continuous behaviour, carries meaning less explicitly and typically conveys emotional/relational rather than cognitive/propositional information. […] By means of NVC we can replace, complement, modify or contradict the spoken word. When it is suspected that the latter was done unintentionally and deceit is possible, nonverbal cues are often regarded as more truthful. We also regulate conversations through gestures, gaze and vocal inflection. Revealing emotions and interpersonal attitudes, negotiating relationships, signalling personal and social identity and contextualising interaction are further uses served by means of haptics, proxemics, kinesics and vocalics, together with physical characteristics of the person and the environment. We need information about other people’s qualities, attributes, attitudes and values in order to know how to deal with them. We often infer personality, attitudes, emotions and social status from the behavioural cues presented to us. […] much of nonverbal meaning is inferred and can be easily misconstrued. It only suggests possibilities and must be interpreted in the overall context of not only verbal but also personal and circumstantial information.” [This is part of what I find really annoying about this kind of stuff – there is no list you can look up where a specific type of nonverbal behaviour only has one interpretation. People may yawn because they’re tired, because they are bored, or perhaps simply because someone else yawned. For some people it’s hard to tell the difference, and if your interpretation is wrong it may have unfortunate effects. I recently visited some acquaintances and grossly misinterpreted the body language of one of these acquaintances. Because I misinterpreted the body language of the acquaintance, I basically found myself getting mentally ready to leave at one point because I figured I was obviously boring them and I was assuming they were signalling this to me while thinking about how best to go about getting rid of me (anxiety and elevated rejection-sensitivity on my part probably played a role as well, but that’s part of the point – lots of things play a role here). It turned out that I had completely misinterpreted the nonverbal communication and that they were having a good time – instead of being asked to leave at the point where I was considering suggesting that I leave to allow them to save face by not making them have to spell it out explicitly that I was no longer welcome, which would be awkward, I ended up staying for another two hours and received verbal feedback to the effect that they had found the interaction to be enjoyable and that they would like to repeat it in the future.]

“reinforcement is based ‘on the simple principle that whenever something reinforces a particular activity of an organism, it increases the chances that the organism will repeat that behavior’. […] a reinforcer, by definition, has the effect of increasing the probability of the preceding behaviour. […] reinforcement can be engineered through positive or negative means. The positive reinforcement principle states that ‘if, in a given situation, somebody does something that is followed immediately by a positive reinforcer, then that person is more likely to do the same thing again when he or she next encounters a similar situation’ […] a reward is something given and received in return for something done. While it may act as a reinforcer, whether or not it actually does is an empirical question. […] [In the context of negative reinforcement,] an act is associated with the avoidance, termination or reduction of an aversive stimulus that would have either occurred or continued at some level had the response not taken place. […] Stated formally, the Premack principle proposes that activities of low probability can be increased in likelihood if activities of high probability are made contingent upon them. […] the influence of rewards is wide ranging and can be indirect. Vicarious reinforcement is the process whereby individuals are more likely to adopt particular behaviours if they see others being rewarded for engaging in them.”

“During social encounters we not only welcome but demand a certain basic level of reward. If it is not forthcoming we may treat this as sufficient grounds for abandoning the relationship in favour of more attractive alternatives. […] rewards can be administered in a planned and systematic fashion to selectively reinforce and shape contributions along particular lines. […] there is little which is either original or profound in the proposition that people are inclined to do things that lead to positive outcomes and avoid other courses of action that produce unwanted consequences. This much is widely known. Indeed, the statement may seem so obvious as to be trivial. But […] despite this general awareness, individuals are often remarkably unsuccessful in bringing about behavioural change in both themselves and other people. […] In addition to influencing what recipients say or do, bestowing rewards also conveys information about the giver. Providers of substantial amounts of social reinforcement are usually perceived to be keenly interested in those with whom they interact and what they have to say. They also typically create an impression of being warm, accepting and understanding. […] By contrast, those who dispense few social rewards are often regarded as cold, aloof, depressed or bored – as well as boring. […] Positive reactions may not only produce more favourable impressions towards those who offer them, but can also result in heightened feelings of self-esteem and self-efficacy in the recipient.”

“People are not merely passive recipients of the reactions of others. Rather, they often make a deliberate effort to present themselves in such a way as to attract a particular type of evaluative response. One motive for this is self-enhancement. Through a process of impression management or self-presentation individuals go out of their way to make themselves as appealing as possible to others […] For some, under certain circumstances, self-verification rather than self-enhancement is what counts […]. Here, it is not necessarily a positive evaluation that is being sought, but rather one that is consistent with the individual’s existing self-referenced views and beliefs […] These findings have interesting and significant ramifications for rewarding and reinforcing. For those with a poor self-concept and low self-esteem, praise and other positive reactions incongruent with how they regard themselves may not be appreciated and fail to have a reinforcing influence. Indeed, the opposite may be the case. […] The success of praise as a reinforcer can be increased […] by ensuring that it: • is applied contingently • specifies clearly the particular behaviour being reinforced • is offered soon after the targeted behaviour • is credible to the recipient • is restricted to those […] who respond best to it […] Praise does not always carry positive messages […] A reward for doing very little provides no useful feedback and does not increase the individual’s sense of competence. […] When seen as an attempt at cynical manipulation, rewards are also likely to be counterproductive […] It is important that social rewards are perceived as genuinely reflecting the source’s reaction to the targeted person or performance.”

“The administration of reinforcement is not solely dependent upon the verbal channel of communication. It has been established that a number of nonverbal behaviours, such as a warm smile or an enthusiastic nod of the head, can also have a reinforcing impact on the behaviour of the other person during interaction. […] The nonverbal channel is particularly adept at communicating states and attitudes such as friendliness, interest, warmth and involvement. […] The establishment of eye contact is usually a preparatory step when initiating interaction. During a conversation, continued use of this behaviour is an indicator of our responsiveness to the other, and level of involvement in the exchange. Its selective use can, therefore, have reinforcing potential. […] Proximity reinforcement refers to potential reinforcing effects that can accrue from altering the distance between oneself and another during interaction. A reduction in interpersonal distance usually accompanies a desire for greater intimacy and involvement. However, while someone who adopts a position at some distance from the other participant may be seen as being unreceptive and detached, a person who approaches too closely may be regarded as overfamiliar, dominant or even threatening.”

“It is not necessary to reinforce constantly each and every instance of a specific response for that class of response to be increased. It has been found that, following an initial period of continual reinforcement to establish the behaviour, the frequency of reinforcement can be reduced without resulting in a corresponding reduction in target behaviour. This is called intermittent reinforcement, and many real-life activities […] are maintained in this way. […] Accordingly, Maag (2003) recommended that rewards should be used sparingly to maximise their reinforcing efficacy. A related recommendation is that recipients have access to these only after performing the desired behaviour. Along similar lines, gain/loss theory predicts that when the receipt of a reward is set against a backdrop of a general paucity of positive reaction from that source, its effect will be enhanced […] The continual and inflexible use of a specific reinforcer will quickly lead to that reinforcer losing its reinforcing properties. The recipient will become satiated. […] An attempt should therefore be made to employ a variety of reinforcing expressions and behaviours […] If reinforcement is delayed, there is a danger that other responses may intervene between the one to be promoted and the presentation of the reinforcer. Making the individual aware of the basis upon which the reinforcer, when it is delivered, is gained may help to reduce the negative effects of delay. […] from a motivational viewpoint, the availability of immediate payoff is likely to have greater incentive value than the prospect of having to wait for some time for personal benefits to materialise. […] selective reinforcement refers to the fact that it is possible to reinforce selectively certain elements of a response without necessarily reinforcing it in total. […] Allied to this process, shaping permits nascent attempts at an ultimately acceptable end performance to be rewarded. By systematically demanding higher standards for rewards to be granted, performances can be shaped to attain requisite levels of excellence. The acquisition of most everyday skills […] involve an element of shaping.”

“The most common division of questions relates to the degree of freedom, or scope, given to the respondent in answering. Those that leave the respondent open to choose any one of a number of ways in which to reply are referred to as open questions, while those that require a short response of a specific nature are termed closed questions. […] Closed questions are usually easy to answer, and so are useful in encouraging early participation in an interaction. […] Closed questions can usually be answered adequately in one or a very few words. They are restricted in nature, imposing limitations on the possible responses that the respondent can make. They give the questioner a high degree of control over the interaction […] Open questions are broad in nature and require more than one or two words for an adequate answer. In general they have the effect of ‘encouraging clients to talk longer and more deeply about their concerns’ […]. They are useful in allowing a respondent to express opinions, attitudes, thoughts and feelings. They do not require any prior knowledge on the part of questioners, who can ask open questions about topics or events with which they are not familiar. They also encourage the respondent to talk, thereby leaving the questioner free to listen and observe. This means, of course, that the respondent has a greater degree of control over the interaction and can determine to a greater extent what is to be discussed […] An important advantage of open questions is that the respondent may reveal information that the questioner had not anticipated. […] Answers to open questions may be time consuming and may also contain irrelevant or less vital information. […] There is research evidence to suggest that a consistent sequence of questions facilitates participation and understanding in respondents […] On the other hand, an erratic sequence of open and closed questions is likely to confuse the respondent and reduce the level of participation. Erratic sequences of questions […] are common in interrogative interviews where the purpose is to confuse suspects […] Generalisations about the relative efficacy of open or closed questions are difficult, since the intellectual capacity of the respondent must be taken into consideration. It has long been known that open questions may not be as appropriate with respondents of lower intellect.”

“questions allow the questioner to control the conversation ‘by requesting the addressee to engage with a specific topic and/or perform a particular responsive action’. […] in most contexts it is the person of higher status, or the person in control, who asks the questions. Thus, the majority of questions are asked by teachers in classrooms, doctors in surgeries, nurses on the ward, lawyers in court, detectives in interrogation rooms and so on.”

“The blatantly incorrect simple leading question serves to place the respondent in the position of expert vis-à-vis the misinformed interviewer. As a result, the respondent may feel obliged to provide information that will enlighten the interviewer. Some of this information may involve the introduction of new and insightful material. While they can be effective in encouraging participation, it is not possible to state how and in what contexts simple leading questions can be most gainfully employed. In certain situations, and with particular types of respondent, their use is counterproductive. […] It has been known for some time that the use of simple leads that are obviously incorrect can induce respondents to participate fully in an interview, in order to correct any misconceptions inherent in the question. […] [However] [m]ost authors of texts on interviewing have eschewed this form of questioning as bad practice. […] Research in interrogation consistently reveals that to be successful the interviewer must build up a rapport with the interviewee and appear to be nonjudgemental […]. Good interrogators possess qualities such as genuineness, trustworthiness, concern, courtesy, tact, empathy, compassion, respect, friendliness, gentleness, receptivity, warmth and understanding. We disclose to such people – they seem to care and do not judge”

August 13, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment

The Problems of Philosophy

Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?

This text is included in Pojman’s book; I read it (Russell’s contribution to the book that is, not the book itself – that book has a lot of stuff…) a while back, but I haven’t really talked about it here on the blog. You can read it here.

I have included a few quotes from the text below. I also added a few personal remarks at the bottom of the post as well.

“In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdities results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy. […] There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to assume that it is true”

“Of course it is not by argument that we originally come by our belief in an independent external world. We find this belief ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an instinctive belief. […] All knowledge, we find, must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left. But among our instinctive beliefs some are much stronger than others, while many have, by habit and association, become entangled with other beliefs, not really instinctive, but falsely supposed to be part of what is believed instinctively.
Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should take care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance.
It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have reason to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence, by organizing our instinctive beliefs and their consequences, by considering which among them is most possible, if necessary, to modify or abandon, we can arrive, on the basis of accepting as our sole data what we instinctively believe, at an orderly systematic organization of our knowledge, in which, though the possibility of error remains, its likelihood is diminished by the interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has preceded acquiescence.
This function, at least, philosophy can perform. Most philosophers, rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy can do much more than this”

“Nothing can be known to exist except by the help of experience. […] Rationalists believed that, from general consideration as to what must be, they could deduce the existence of this or that in the actual world. In this belief they seem to have been mistaken. All the knowledge that we can acquire a priori concerning existence seems to be hypothetical: it tells us that if one thing exists, another must exist, or, more generally, that if one proposition is true, another must be true. […] the scope and power of a priori principles is strictly limited. All knowledge that something exists must be in part dependent on experience. When anything is known immediately, its existence is known by experience alone; when anything is proved to exist, without being known immediately, both experience and a priori principles must be required in the proof. Knowledge is called empirical when it rests wholly or partly upon experience. Thus all knowledge which asserts existence is empirical, and the only a priori knowledge concerning existence is hypothetical, giving connexions among things that exist or may exist, but not giving actual existence.”

“We may believe what is false as well as what is true. We know that on very many subjects different people hold different and incompatible opinions: hence some beliefs must be erroneous. Since erroneous beliefs are often held just as strongly as true beliefs, it becomes a difficult question how they are to be distinguished from true beliefs. […some talk about the correspondence theory of truth] […] minds do not create truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are within the power of the person believing, such as catching trains. What makes a belief true is a fact, and this fact does not (except in exceptional cases) in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief.”

“to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy. This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. […] The value of philosophy is […] to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. […] Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation”

I know I’m repeating myself because I’ve said similar things in the past, but I still consider it an important point to add: Many people over time have wasted their lives pondering questions which they would not have been asking themselves if only they had known more stuff about the world. In my model of the world, people need to rely on knowledge to ask good questions, and the more one knows about the world, the better one gets at asking the right questions about it. Thinking about stuff is different from knowing stuff, and the payoff schedule related to ‘knowing more stuff’ for most people will look very different from the payoff schedule related to ‘thinking more about stuff’. People in general have much less knowledge than they ought to have in order to support the opinions they already hold.

On a related matter, if you’re repeatedly engaging yourself in the activity of asking questions to which no answers exist, you’re in my mind – I know some philosophers will disagree – quite likely to be asking the wrong questions and to be wasting your time.

August 12, 2014 Posted by | Books, Philosophy | 5 Comments

Evolution and the Levels of Selection

After I’d read the book I googled the author and I came across this lecture, which is actually a really nice lecture about many of the ideas also included in the book:

The stuff covered during the last five minutes or so of the talk is not in the book – there’s no political theory or similar in there – but most of the other stuff is. The book is somewhat more theoretical than the lecture; there’s no stuff about vampire bats in there. It probably also goes without saying that the coverage in the book provides a lot more detail than does the lecture, which only really scratches the surface; the analytical level is quite a bit higher in the book.

The book is in my opinion an example of really good philosophy of science. I liked the book a lot, it’s really nicely written and the author seems to be a very precise and careful writer and thinker. There are pretty much no superfluous pages in the book, which also means that I’ve actually been a bit conflicted about how to blog it, because it seemed impossible to go over all those ideas in just a blog post or two. I suggest you watch the lecture; if you like the lecture and/or want to know more about the ideas presented there, you’ll want to read this book.

The book includes some equations here and there, but nothing you shouldn’t be able to handle. Some really important ideas in the book are not mentioned in the lecture, but this is natural given the format – there’s only so much stuff you can pack into one lecture. For example in any two-level setting including ‘particles’ and ‘collectives’, the question arises of how to even define collective (/’group’) fitness. One might define it as “the average or total fitness of its constituent particles; so the fittest collective is the one that contributes most offspring particles to future generations of particles.” Or one might define it as “the number of offspring collectives it leaves; so the fittest collective is the one that contributes the most offspring collectives to future generations of collectives.” The distinction between these two conceptualizations of collective fitness actually is really important in some analytical contexts, and this is definitely a distinction worth keeping in mind.

I may cover the book in more detail later, but for now I’ll limit coverage to the comments above and to the lecture. In my opinion it’s a really nice book, I gave it five stars on goodreads.

August 9, 2014 Posted by | Biology, Books, Evolutionary biology, Genetics, Lectures | 12 Comments

Open Thread

Some random observations and some links:

i. I’ve written about diabetic hypoglycemia before – I even blogged a book on the topic just a few weeks ago. So I’ll keep this short. Here’s the key observation from the post to which I link: “Hypoglycemia causes functional brain failure that is corrected in the vast majority of instances after the plasma glucose concentration is raised”.

Functional brain failure is pretty much what it sounds like – the brain stops working. The point I want to make here is that hypoglycemia can strike pretty much at any point in time, including when I’m doing stuff like blogging or commenting. I sometimes develop hypoglycemia while deeply engrossed in some intellectual activity, like reading, writing or chess, in part because in those situations I have a tendency to forget to listen to my body’s signals – perhaps I forget to eat because this stuff is really much more interesting than food, perhaps I don’t really care that I should probably take a blood test now because I’d really much rather just finish this book chapter/chess game/blogpost/whatever. That happens. When it happens while I’m blogging, what comes out the other end may look funny. I occasionally write stuff that’s incoherent and stupid. Sometimes the explanation is simple: I’m an idiot. Sometimes other things play a role as well.

This is a variable you cannot observe, but which I have a lot of information about. It’s a variable I’d like readers of this blog to at least be aware of.

ii. Maxwell wrote this post, which you should consider reading. I won’t pretend to have good reasons/justifications for disliking people I conceive of as arrogant, but I do want to note that I do this and always have. Arrogance is a trait I dislike immensely.

iii. Over the last few days I’ve been reading Okasha’s great book Evolution and the Levels of Selection (I’ve almost finished it and I expect to blog it tomorrow) – so of course when Zach Weiner came up with this joke yesterday, I laughed. Loudly:

 

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(Click to view full size. The comic of course has almost nothing to do with the content of the book, but I’ll take any excuse I can get for blogging that comic…)

iv. The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Available to you, online, free of charge. Stuff like this sometimes makes me think we live in a very nice world at this point.

But then I read posts/watch videos like this one and I’m reminded that things are, complicated.

v. A few Khan Academy lectures:

August 8, 2014 Posted by | Genetics, History, Khan Academy, Lectures, Medicine, Personal, Physics | 9 Comments

Quotes

i. “I intend no Monopoly, but a Community in Learning; I study not for my own sake only, but for theirs that study not for themselves.” (Thomas Browne)

ii. “No man can justly censure or condemn another, because indeed no man truly knows another.” (-ll-)

iii. “A cynic is what an idealist calls a realist.” (Humphrey Appleby)

iv. “Words are but the shadows of actions.” (Democritus, as quoted by Plutarch)

v.  “To esteem everything is to esteem nothing.” (Molière)

vi. “Death is the inventor of God.” (José Saramago)

vii. “There are people. There are stories. The people think they shape the stories, but the reverse is often closer to the truth.” (Alan Moore)

viii. “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out just what any people will submit to, and you have found out the exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them; and these will continue till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress.” (Frederick Douglass)

ix. “All men think all men mortal but themselves.” (Edward Young)

x. “What ardently we wish we soon believe.” (-ll-)

xi. “Old age, after all, is merely the punishment for having lived.” (Emil Cioran)

xii. “We only do well the things we like doing.” (Colette)

xiii. “To die is poignantly bitter, but the idea of having to die without having lived is unbearable.” (Erich Fromm)

xiv. “I have grown accustomed to the disrespect expressed by some of the participants for their colleagues in the other disciplines. “Why, Dan,” ask the people in artificial intelligence, “do you waste your time conferring with those neuroscientists? They wave their hands about ‘information processing’ and worry about where it happens, and which neurotransmitters are involved, but they haven’t a clue about the computational requirements of higher cognitive functions.” “Why,” ask the neuroscientists, “do you waste your time on the fantasies of artificial intelligence? They just invent whatever machinery they want, and say unpardonably ignorant things about the brain.” The cognitive psychologists, meanwhile, are accused of concocting models with neither biological plausibility nor proven computational powers; the anthropologists wouldn’t know a model if they saw one, and the philosophers, as we all know, just take in each other’s laundry, warning about confusions they themselves have created, in an arena bereft of both data and empirically testable theories. With so many idiots working on the problem, no wonder consciousness is still a mystery. All these charges are true, and more besides, but I have yet to encounter any idiots. Mostly the theorists I have drawn from strike me as very smart people – even brilliant people, with the arrogance and impatience that often comes with brilliance – but with limited perspectives and agendas, trying to make progress on the hard problems by taking whatever shortcuts they can see, while deploring other people’s shortcuts. No one can keep all the problems and details clear, including me, and everyone has to mumble, guess and handwave about large parts of the problem.” (Daniel Dennett. I really liked this quote, which is why I included it in this post despite it being quite a bit longer than the quotes I usually include in posts like these)

xv. “There is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness,” because there is no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theatre where “it all comes together” for the perusal of a Central Meaner. Instead of such a single stream (however wide), there are multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. […] The basic specialists are part of our animal heritage. They were not developed to perform peculiarly human actions, such as reading and writing, but ducking, predator-avoiding, face-recognizing, grasping, throwing, berry-picking, and other essential tasks. They are often opportunistically enlisted in new roles, for which their talents may more or less suit them.” (Daniel Dennett)

xvi. “The evidence of evolution pours in, not only from geology, paleontology, biogeography, and anatomy (Darwin’s chief sources), but from molecular biology and every other branch of the life sciences. To put it bluntly but fairly, anyone today who doubts that the variety of life on this planet was produced by a process of evolution is simply ignorant — inexcusably ignorant, in a world where three out of four people have learned to read and write.” (-ll-)

xvii. “Those who fear the facts will forever try to discredit the fact-finders.” (-ll-)

xviii. “The sorrow for the dead is the only sorrow from which we refuse to be divorced. Every other wound we seek to heal — every other affliction to forget: but this wound we consider it a duty to keep open — this affliction we cherish and brood over in solitude.” (Washington Irving)

xix. “The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it.” (Laurence Sterne)

xx. “What is today supported by precedents will hereafter become a precedent.” (Tacitus)

August 7, 2014 Posted by | Quotes/aphorisms | 5 Comments

The Woman Who Died A Lot

I gave the book four stars on goodreads. Jasper Fforde’s Thursday Next series consists of seven books (so far), and by finishing this one I have now read the entire series. If you have ideas for what I should read next (I’m currently reading Saramago’s The Gospel According to Jesus Christ, a birthday present, but I’ll finish that one very soon) you’re welcome to add suggestions in the comment section below; do note that I read this series as a direct consequence of a reader recommending it.

The book is funny and absurd just like the others in the series, but I liked some of the others a bit better; it’s occasionally a bit too silly for my taste.

I have added some sample quotes from the book below.

“he tended to look upon me as the daughter he’d wished he had, and not the one he did have, who was a bit of a tramp.”

“‘You seem quite young,’ said Landen.
‘It’s due to my age,’ said Phoebe”

“On a worktop near by lay a machine that could assemble itself into a machine that would be able to dissemble itself, the practical applications of which were somewhat obscure.”

“‘I remember turning off the M4 and on to the M5, but I couldn’t swear to it. Next thing I know I’m sitting on a bench in Carlisle railway station five days later with £40.000 in cash, eight kilos of bootleg Camembert in the car and a wife waiting for me in Wrexham.’
‘You explained all this to SO-5?’
‘Many times. Quinn was the same, only she “came to” a day sooner than me, upside down in a Mercedes she had bought for cash two hours previously. There was an iguana on the back seat and the boot was full of rabbits.’
I exchanged looks with Landen. One of Aornis’s little memory tricks was to make you think you were someone you weren’t, then send you off to cause mayhem on the five-day non-recall bender.”

“‘This is Geraldine,’ said Duffy, ‘the assistant’s assistant to the assistant personal assistant of my own personal assistant’s assistant.’ […] ‘How many assistants do I have?’ I asked, turning back to Duffy.
‘Including me, three.’
‘Three? Given Geraldine’s job title? How is that possible?’
‘They have multiple jobs. Geraldine, apart from being the assistant’s assistant to the assistant personal assistant of my own personal assistant’s assistant, is also my own personal assistant’s assistant’s assistant.’
‘No,’ said Geraldine, ‘that’s Lucy. I’m not only your assistant’s assistant’s sub-assistant, but also the assistant to the assitant to your personal assistant’s assistant.’
‘Wait,’ I said, thinking hard, ‘that must make you your own assistant.’
‘Yes; I had to fire myself yesterday. Luckily I was also above the assistant who fired me, so I could reinstate myself.”

“‘Tell me,’ I said, ‘did the previous Chief Librarian really vanish without trace?’
‘Not entirely,’ said Duffy, passing me a photograph of a concrete monorail support somewhere on the Wantage branch line. ‘We were sent this.’
I stared at the photograph.
‘Did you tell the police?’
‘They said it was nothing and that people get sent pictures of concrete monorail supports all the time.’
‘Do they?’
‘No, not really.'”

“‘And house prices are tumbling,’ said another. ‘If I wanted to sell I’d have to accept half of what I paid for it.'”
‘And what did you pay for it?’ I asked. ‘Just out of interest.’
‘A hundred pounds. They’re dirt cheap because no one wants to live here.’
‘We get occasional backflashes too,’ said the fourth.
‘And what did you pay for it?’ I asked. ‘Just out of interest?’
‘A hundred pounds. They’re dirt cheap because no one wants to live here.’
‘We get occasional backflashes too,’ said the fourth, ‘but we only know that from external observers. Ooh, look,’ he added, pointing to a woman standing two hundred yards away who was waving a red flag, ‘Lori says we’ve just had one.'”

“‘Gavin, how did you turn out to be such a nasty piece of work?’
He shrugged.
‘I could blame my parents but that’s just whiny victim bullshit. Some people are just naturally unpleasant. I’ve known for a long time that I’m something of a shit. I tried for years to hide it, but it never worked, so in the end I decided to just go with it, and see where it lead me. What’s your excuse?'”

August 6, 2014 Posted by | Books | 4 Comments

The Emergence of Animals: The Cambrian Breakthrough (II)

I decided to write one more post (this one) about the book and leave it at that. Go here for my first post about the book, which has some general remarks about the book, as well as a lot of relevant links to articles from wikipedia which cover topics also covered in the book. Below I have added some observations from the second half of the book.

“Use of bedrock geology to reconstruct ancient continental positions relies on the idea that if two separated continents were once joined to form a single, larger continent, then there ought to be distinctive geological terranes (such as mineral belts, mountain chains, bodies of igneous rock of similar age, and other roughly linear to irregularly-shaped large-scale geologic features) that were once contiguous but are now separated. Matching of these features can provide clues to the positions of continents that were once together. […] The main problem with using bedrock geology features to match continental puzzle pieces together is that many of the potentially most useful linear geologic features on the continents (such as volcanic arcs or chains of volcanoes, and continental margin fold belts or parallel mountain chains formed by compression of strata) are parallel to the edge of the continent. Therefore, these features generally run parallel to rift fractures, and are less likely to continue and be recognizable on any continent that was once connected to the continent in question.

Paleomagnetic evidence is an important tool for the determination of ancient continent positions and for the reconstruction of supercontinents. Nearly all rock types, be they sedimentary or igneous, contain minerals that contain the elements iron or titanium. Many of these iron- and titanium-bearing minerals are magnetic. […] The magnetization of a crystal of a magnetic mineral (such as magnetite) is established immediately after the mineral crystallizes from a volcanic melt (lava) but before it cools below the Curie point temperature. Each magnetic mineral has its own specific Curie point. […] As the mineral grain passes through the Curie point, the ambient magnetic field is “frozen” into the crystal and will remain unchanged until the crystal is destroyed by weathering or once again heated above the Curie point. This “locking in” of the magnetic signal in igneous rock crystals is the crucial event for paleomagnetism, for it indicates the direction of magnetic north at the time the crystal cooled (sometime in the distant geologic past for most igneous rocks). The ancient latitudinal position of the rock (and the continent of which it is a part) can be determined by measuring the direction of the crystal’s magnetization. For ancient rocks, this direction can be quite different from the direction of present day magnetic north. […] Paleomagnetic reconstruction is a form of geological analysis that is, unfortunately, fraught with uncertainties. The original magnetization is easily altered by weathering and metamorphism, and can confuse or obliterate the original magnetic signal. An inherent limitation of paleomagnetic reconstruction of ancient continental positions is that the magnetic remanence only gives information concerning the rocks’ latitudinal position, and gives no clue as to the original longitudinal position of the rocks in question. For example, southern Mexico and central India, although nearly half a world apart, are both at about 20 degrees North latitude, and, therefore, lavas cooling in either country would have essentially the same primary magnetic remanence. One of the few ways to get information about the ancient longitudinal positions of continents is to use comparison of life forms on different continents. The study of ancient distributions of organisms is called paleobiogeography.”

“Photosynthesis is generally considered to be a characteristic of plants in the traditional usage of the term “plant.” Nonbiologists are sometimes surprised to learn that [some] animals are photosynthetic […] One might argue that marine animals with zooxanthellae (symbiotic protists) are not truly photosynthetic because it is the protists that do the photosynthesis, not the animal. The protists just happen to be inside the animal. We would argue that this is not an important consideration, since photosynthesis in all eukaryotic (nucleated) cells is accomplished by chloroplasts, tiny organelles that are the cell’s photosynthesis factories. Chloroplasts are now thought by many biologists to have arisen by a symbiosis event in which a small, photosynthetic moneran took up symbiotic residence within a larger microbe […]. The symbiotic relationship eventually became so well established that it became an obligatory relationship for both the host microbe and the smaller symbiont moneran. Reproductive provisions were made to pass the genetic material of the symbiont, as well as the host, on to succeeding generations. It would sound strange to describe an oak as a “multicellular alga invaded by photosynthetic moneran symbionts,” but that is — in essence — what a tree is. Animals with photosynthetic protists in their bodies are able to create food internally, in the same way that an oak tree can, so we feel that these animals can be correctly called photosynthetic. […] Many of the most primitive types of living metazoa contain photosymbiotic
microbes or chloroplasts derived from microbes.”

“The most obvious reason for any organism, regardless of what kingdom it belongs to, to evolve a leaf-shaped body is to maximize its surface area. Leaf shape evolves in response to factors in addition to surface area requirement, but the surface area requirement, in all cases we are aware of, is the most important factor. […] Leaves of modern plants and Ediacaran animals probably evolved similar shapes for the same reason, namely, maximization of surface area. […] Photosymbiosis is not the only possible departure from heterotrophic feeding, the usual method of food acquisition for modern animals. Seilacher (1984) notes that flat bodies are good for absorption of simple compounds such as hydrogen sulfide, needed for one type of chemosymbiosis. In chemosymbiosis as in photosymbiosis, microbes (in this case bacteria) are held within an animal’s tissues as paying guests. The bacteria are able to use the energy stored in hydrogen sulphide molecules that diffuse into the host animal’s tissues. The bacteria use the hydrogen sulfide to create food, using biochemical reactions that would be impossible for animals to do by themselves. The bacteria use some of the food for themselves, but great excesses are produced and passed on to the host animal’s tissues. […] There may be important similarities between the ecologies of
[…] flattened Ediacaran creatures and the modern deep sea vent faunas. […] A form of chemotrophy (feeding on chemicals) that does not involve symbiosis is simple absorption of nutrients dissolved in sea water. Although this might not seem a particularly efficient way of obtaining food, there are tremendous amounts of “unclaimed” organic material dissolved in sea water. Monerans allow these nutrients to diffuse into their cells, a fact well known to microbiologists. Less well known is the fact that larger organisms can feed in this way also. Benthic foraminifera up to 38 millimeters long from McMurdo Sound, Antarctica, take up dissolved organic matter largely as a function of the surface area of their branched bodies”

“Although there is as of yet no unequivocal proof, it seems reasonable to infer from their shapes that members of the Ediacaran fauna used photosymbiosis, chemosymbiosis, and direct nutrient absorption to satisfy their food needs. Since these methods do not involve killing, eating, and digesting other living things, we will refer to them as “soft path” feeding strategies. Heterotrophic organisms use “hard path” feeding strategies because they need to use up the bodies of other organisms for energy. The higher in the food pyramid, the “harder” the feeding strategy, on up to the keystone predator (top carnivore) at the top of any particular ecosystem’s trophic pyramid. It is important to note that the term “hard,” as used here, does not necessarily imply that autotrophic organisms have any easier a time obtaining their food than do heterotrophic organisms. Green plants are not very efficient at converting sunlight to food; sunlight can be thought of as an elusive prey because it is not a concentrated energy source […]. Low food concentrations are a major difficulty encountered by organisms employing soft path feeding strategies. Deposit feeding is intermediate between hard and soft paths. […] Filter feeding, or capturing food suspended in the water, also has components of both hard and soft paths because suspension feeders can take both living and nonliving food from the water.”

“Probing deposit feeders […] began to excavate sediments to depths of several centimeters at the beginning of the Cambrian. Dwelling burrows several centimeters in length, such as Skolithos, first appeared in the Cambrian, and provided protection for filter-feeding animals. If a skeleton is broadly defined as a rigid body support, a burrow is in essence a skeleton formed of sediment […] Movement of metazoans into the substrate had profound implications for sea floor marine ecology. One aspect of the environment that controls the number and types of organisms living in the environment is called its dimensionality […]. Two-dimensional (or Dimension 2) environments tend to be flat, whereas three-dimensional environments (Dimension 3) have, to a greater or lesser degree, a third dimension. This third dimension can be either in an upward or a downward direction, or a combination of both directions. The Vendian sea floor was essentially a two-dimensional environment. […] With the probable exception of some of the stalked frond fossils, most Vendian soft-bodied forms hugged the sea floor. Deep burrowers added a third dimension to the benthos (sea floor communities), creating a three-dimensional environment where a two-dimensional situation had prevailed. The greater the dimensionality in any given environment, the longer the food chain and the taller the trophic pyramid can be […]. If the appearance of abundant predators is any indication, lengthening of the food chain seems to be an important aspect of the Cambrian explosion. Changes in animal anatomy and intelligence can be linked to this lengthening of the food chain. Most Cambrian animals are three-dimensional creatures, not flattened like many of their Vendian predecessors. Animals like mollusks and worms, even if they lack mineralized skeletons, are able to rigidify their bodies with the use of a water-filled internal skeleton called a coelom […] This fluid-filled cavity gives an animal’s body stiffness, and acts much like a turgid, internal, water balloon. A coelom allows animals to burrow in sediment in ways that a flattened animal (such as, for instance, a flatworm) cannot. It is most likely that a coelom first evolved in those Vendian shallow scribble-trail makers that were contemporaries of the large soft-bodied fossils. Some of these Ediacaran burrows show evidence of peristaltic burrowing. Inefficient peristaltic burrowing can be done without a coelom, but with a coelom it becomes dramatically more effective.”

Bilateral symmetry is important when considering the behavior of […] early coelomate animals. The most likely animal to evolve a brain is one with bilateral symmetry. Concomitant with the emergence of animals during the Vendian was the origin of brains. The Cambrian explosion was the first cerebralization or encephalization event. As part of the increase in the length of the food chain discussed above, higher-level consumers such as top or keystone predators established a mode of life that requires the seeking out and attacking of prey. These activities are greatly aided by having a brain able to organize and control complex behavior. […] Specialized light receptors seem to be a characteristic of all animals and many other types of organisms; […] photoreceptors have originated independently in at least forty and perhaps as many as sixty groups. Most animal phyla have at a minimum several pigmented eye spots. But advanced vision (i. e., compound or image-forming eyes) tied directly into a centralized brain is not common or well developed until the Cambrian. The tendency to have eyes is more pronounced for bilateral than for radial animals. […] some of the earliest trilobites had large compound eyes. Trilobites were probably not particularly smart by modern standards, but chances are that their behavioral capabilities far outstripped any that had existed during the early Vendian. […] Actively moving or vagile predators are, as a rule, smarter than their prey, because of the more rigorous requirements of information processing in a predatory life mode. Anomalocaris as a seek-and-destroy top predator may have been the brainiest Early Cambrian animal.”

“why didn’t brains and advanced predation develop much earlier that they did? A simple, thought experiment may help address this problem. Consider a jellyfish 1 mm in length and a cylindrical worm 1 mm in length. Increase the size (linear dimension) of each (by growth of the individual or by evolutionary change over thousands of generations) one hundred times. […] The worm will need internal plumbing because of its cylindrical body. The jellyfish won’t be as dependent on plumbing because its body has a higher surface area. […] Our enlarged, 10 cm long worm will possess a brain which has a volume one million times greater than the brain of its 1 mm predecessor (assuming that the shape of the brain remains constant). The jellyfish will also get more nerve tissue as it enlarges. But its nervous system is spread out in a netlike fashion; at most, its nerve tissue will be concentrated at a few radially symmetric points. The potential for complex and easily reprogrammed behavior, as well as sophisticated processing of sensory input data, is much greater in the animal with the million times larger brain (containing at least a million times as many brain cells as its tiny predecessor). Complex neural pathways are more likely to form in the larger brain. This implies no mysterious tendency for animals to grow larger brains; perfectly successful, advanced animals (echinoderms) and even slow-moving predators (sea spiders) get along fine without much brain. But centralized nerve tissue can process information better than a nerve net and control more complex responses to stimuli. Once brains were used to locate food, the world would never again be the same. This can be thought of as a “brain revolution” that permanently changed the world a half billion years ago.”

“There is little doubt that organisms produced oxygen before 2 billion years ago, but this oxygen was unable to accumulate as a gas because iron dissolved in seawater combined with the oxygen to form rust (iron oxide), a precipitate that sank, chemically inactive, to accumulate on the sea floor. Just as salt has accumulated in the oceans over billions of years, unoxidized (or reduced) iron was abundant in the seas before 2 billion years ago, and was available to “neutralize” the waste oxygen. Thus, dissolved iron performed an important oxygen disposal service; oxygen is a deadly toxin to organisms that do not have special enzymes to limit its reactivity. Once the reduced iron was removed from sea water (and precipitated on the sea floor as Precambrian iron formations; much of the iron mined for our automobiles is derived from these formations), oxygen began to accumulate in water and air. Life in the seas was either restricted to environments where oxygen remained rare, or was forced to develop enzymes […] capable of detoxifying oxygen. Oxygen could also be used by heterotrophic organisms to “burn” the biologic fuel captured in the form of the bodies of their prey. […] Much research has focused on lowered levels of atmospheric oxygen during the Precambrian. The other alternative, that oxygen levels were higher at times during the Precambrian than at present has not been much discussed. Once the “sinks” for free oxygen, such as dissolved iron, were saturated, there is little that would have prevented oxygen levels in the Precambrian from getting much higher than they are today. This is particularly so since there is no evidence for the presence of Precambrian land plants which could have acted as a negative feedback for continued increases in oxygen levels” [Here’s a recent-ish paper on the topicdo note that there’s an important distinction to be made between atmospheric oxygen levels and the oxygen levels of the oceans].

August 4, 2014 Posted by | Biology, Books, Botany, Ecology, Evolutionary biology, Geology, Microbiology, Paleontology, Zoology | Leave a comment

Skilled interpersonal communication (I)

“There are 14 main skill areas covered in this text, beginning with nonverbal communication (NVC) in Chapter 3. This aspect of interaction is the first to be examined, since all of the areas that follow contain nonverbal elements and so an understanding of the main facets of this channel facilitates the examination of all the other skills. Chapter 4 incorporates an analysis of reinforcement, while questioning is reviewed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, an alternative strategy to questioning, namely reflecting, is investigated. Reflection consists of concentrating on what another person is saying and reflecting back the central elements of that person’s statements.
The skill of listening is explored in Chapter 7, where the active nature of listening is emphasised, while explaining is focused upon in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, self-disclosure is examined from two perspectives; first, the appropriateness of self-disclosure by the professional, and second, methods for promoting maximum self-disclosure from clients. Two important episodes in any action – the opening and closing sequences – are reviewed in Chapter 10. Techniques for protecting personal rights are discussed in Chapter 11 in terms of the skill of assertiveness. The skill area of influencing and persuading has attracted growing interest in recent years and this is covered in Chapter 12, and the related skill of negotiation is addressed in Chapter 13. Finally, in Chapter 14 the skills involved in interacting in and leading small group discussions are examined.”

I’m currently reading this book.

So far it seems like a pretty standard textbook. It’s pretty dense, in the sense that Hargie talks about a lot of things. On the other hand in other ways it is, not very dense; Hargie doesn’t spend any time on methodology and stuff like how to conduct research in this area (which seems curious to me, as I take this to be a first-year text). He does not seem to be particularly concerned about drawing conclusions from small studies from, say, the 70’es. On the plus side, in many cases you’re implicitly or explicitly made aware that these were small studies and/or that this result is only supported by a couple of studies. Unfortunately a few of the things Hargie writes about I take him to know a lot less about than I do – for example he’s obviously never read Aureli et al. – and one might well argue that his lack of knowledge is sort of a problem when you look at some specific parts of the coverage (perhaps more on account of topics not covered than on account of things actually covered, but there have been parts of the coverage where I noted in the margin that ‘we know a lot more about this kind of stuff than he lets on’, or ‘this would have been much more interesting if he’d also included the results of animal studies on related topics’). Most texts I read these days are written by multiple authors, and I do believe such books are in general of a higher quality than are single-author publications, in part because they’re much less likely to have blind spots like these. This book would probably (I can’t really say for sure at this point, as I’ve still yet to read most of it) have benefited from the inclusion of more biological research and less psychological research. But there are many interesting observations in this book, and most of the topics covered are both topics about which I don’t know much, and topics about which I’d probably benefit from knowing more. I have added some of the interesting observations from the book below.

“In the successful learning of new skills we move through the stages of unconscious incompetence (we are totally unaware of the fact that we are behaving in an incompetent manner), conscious incompetence (we know what we should be doing and we know we are not doing it very well), conscious competence (we know we are performing at a satisfactory level) and finally unconscious competence (we just do it without thinking about it and we succeed). This is also true of interpersonal skills. During free-flowing social encounters, less than 200 milliseconds typically elapses between the responses of speakers and rarely do conversational pauses reach three seconds. As a result, some elements, such as exact choice of words used and use of gestures, almost always occur without conscious reflection (Wilson et al., 2000). […] Skilled responses are hierarchically organised in such a way that large elements, like being interviewed, are comprised of smaller behavioural units such as looking at the interviewer and answering questions. The development of interpersonal skills can be facilitated by training the individual to acquire these smaller responses before combining them into larger repertoires. Indeed, this technique is also used in the learning of many motor skills. […] Skilled behaviour involves implementing behaviours at the most apposite juncture. Learning when to employ behaviours is just as crucial as learning what these behaviours are and how to use them.”

“It is widely agreed that relationships are shaped around two main dimensions that have to do with affiliation (or liking) and dominance, although a third concerning level of involvement or the intensity of the association also seems to be important […] Power is also an important factor in human relationships […]. When people with relatively little social power, occupying inferior status positions, interact with those enjoying power over them, the former have been shown […] to manifest their increased ‘accessibility’ by, among other things:

• initiating fewer topics for discussion
• being more hesitant in what they say
• being asked more questions
• providing more self-disclosures
• engaging in less eye contact while speaking
• using politer forms of address
• using more restrained touch.

Sets of expectations are constructed around these parameters. It is not only the case that people with little power behave in these ways; there are norms or implicit expectations that they should do so.”

“There is evidence that introverts tend to speak less, make more frequent use of pauses, engage in lower frequencies of gaze at their partners, are less accurate at encoding emotion and prefer to interact at greater interpersonal distances ( John et al., 2008; Knapp and Hall, 2010).”

“Given the inherent fluidity of interaction, Berger (1995: 149) argued persuasively that ‘reducing the actions necessary to reach social goals to a rigid, script-like formula may produce relatively ineffective social action’. […] Skilled communication must always be adaptively and reflexively responsive to the emotional needs of the other.”

“There is a reduced prospect of successful face-to-face interaction in situations where interactors have little appreciation of their own NVC [Non-Verbal Communication], or a lack of sensitivity to the other person’s body language. This is as applicable to work as it is to everyday social situations. […] the verbal medium has often been set as a benchmark for assessing the significance of the nonverbal. Consider a situation where a person is saying something but conveying an altogether different message through NVC. Which holds sway? What are the relative contributions of the two to the overall message received? In early research, still frequently cited, it was estimated that overall communication was made up of body language (55 per cent), paralanguage (the nonverbal aspects of speech) (38 per cent) and the verbal content (7 per cent) (Mehrabian, 1972). It may come as something of a surprise to learn that what we say may contribute a mere 7 per cent to the overall message received. These proportions, however, should not be regarded as absolute and seriously underrepresent the contribution of verbal communication in circumstances where information from all three channels is largely congruent. Guerrero and Floyd (2006) offered a more modest estimate of 60 to 65 per cent of meaning carried nonverbally during social exchanges. While likewise questioning the veracity of the Mehrabian figures, a review by Burgoon et al. (1996) nevertheless still identified a general trend favouring the primacy of meaning carried nonverbally, with a particular reliance upon visual cues. But qualifying conditions apply. The finding holds more for adults in situations of message incongruity and where the message has to do with emotional, relational or impression-forming outcomes.”

“Detailed analyses have revealed some of the strategies used to prevent over-talk, handle it when it occurs, and generally manage turn-taking […]. NVC is an important part of this process. Conversationalists are able to anticipate when they will have an opportunity to take the floor. Duncan and Fiske (1977) identified a number of nonverbal indices that offer a speaking turn to the other person. These include a rise or fall in pitch at the end of a clause, a drop in voice volume, termination of hand gestures and change in gaze pattern. In addition, they found that if a speaker persisted with a gesticulation even when not actually talking at that point, it essentially eliminated attempts by the listener to take over the turn.
Hence, someone […] coming to the end of a speech turn will typically introduce a downward vocal inflection (unless they have just asked a question), stop gesticulating and look at their partner […] NVC is a crucial source of information on how we feel, and how we feel about others. Furthermore, relating successfully depends upon competence in both encoding (sending) and decoding (interpreting) NVC […] Facial expressions represent an important emotional signalling system, although body movements and gestures are also implicated. […] six basic emotions consistently decodable are sadness, anger, disgust, fear, surprise and happiness, with contempt as a possible seventh. There is evidence that we may be specially attuned to process certain types of emotional information leading to the rapid recognition of anger and threat […] questions have been raised over the extent to which facial expressions can be thought of as the direct products of underlying biologically determined affective states […] An alternative way of viewing them is as a means of signalling behavioural intent.”

“Through largely nonverbal means, people establish, sustain, strengthen or indeed terminate a relational position. This can be done on an ongoing basis, as adjustments are made to ensure that levels of involvement are acceptable. Immediacy or psychological closeness is a feature of interaction that is regulated in part nonverbally, and indeed has been singled out as arguably the most important function of NVC […]. Immediacy has to do with warmth, depth of involvement or degree of intensity characterising an encounter. It is expressed through a range of indices including eye contact, interpersonal distance, smiling and touch, and must be appropriate to the encounter. Violating expectations in respect of these, for example by coming too close, gazing too much, leaning too far forward or orienting too directly, can lead to discomfort on the part of the recipient, compensatory shifts by that person and negative evaluations of the violator”

“according to communication accommodation theory […], interlocutors convey their attitudes about one another and indicate their relational aspirations by the extent to which they tailor aspects of their communicative performance to make these more compatible with those of the other. They may adjust their initial discrepant speech rate, for instance, to find a balanced compromise or alternatively accentuate difference if they find they have little desire to promote commonality, reduce social distance or seek approval. When individuals are actively managing personal relationships it would often be too disturbing to state openly that the other was not liked or thought to be inferior. Nonverbal cues can be exchanged about these states but without the message ever being made explicit.”

“Aspects of social power, dominance and affiliation are conveyed through nonverbal channels. Amount of talk (talk time), loudness of speech, seating location, posture, touch, gestures and proximity are instrumental in conveying who is controlling the situation as the dominant party in an interaction […] Powerful individuals, when interacting with subordinates, tend to indulge in more non-reciprocated touch […] Those displaying such behaviour also attract higher ratings of power and dominance than the recipients of that contact […] That said, Andersen (2008) concluded from his review of the evidence that touch had actually more to do with conveying immediacy and intimacy than with status and dominance. […] touch was one of the principal components of the expression of immediacy reviewed by Guerrero (2005). […] haptic communication seems to change across the lifespan. Younger men (under 30 years) and those in dating relationships (rather than being married) have been found to touch more than females […] marital status is also important in that unmarried men have more favourable reactions to touch than unmarried women, while for married males and females this pattern is reversed.”

“Posture is one of the cues used to make decisions about the relative status of those we observe and deal with […] The degree of relaxation exuded seems to be a telling feature […]. High-status individuals characteristically adopt a more relaxed position when they are seated (e.g. body tilting sideways; lying slumped in a chair) than low-status subjects who are more upright and rigid. When standing, people in a position of power and influence again appear more relaxed, often with arms crossed or hands in pockets, than those in subordinate positions who are generally ‘straighter’ and ‘stiffer’. Those with high status are also likely to take up more expansive postures, standing at their full height, chest expanded and with hands on hips (Argyle, 1988).”

“A seated person who leans forward towards the other is deemed to have a more positive attitude towards both the person and the topic under discussion than when leaning backwards […] most prolonged interactions are conducted with both participants either sitting or standing, rather than one standing, and the other sitting. Where this situation does occur, communication is usually cursory (e.g. information desks) or strained (e.g. interrogation sessions). Relative posture adopted is a significant marker of how interactors feel about each other and of the relationship between them. Postural congruence or mirroring occurs when similar or mirror-image postures are taken up, with ongoing adjustments to maintain synchrony. Common matched behaviours include leg positions, leaning forward, head propping, facial expressions and hand and arm movements. This form of ‘mimicry’, which is usually carried out subconsciously, is taken as a positive sign that the exchange is harmonious. Research findings show that ‘mimicry serves an important social function in that it facilitates the smoothness of interactions and increases liking between interaction partners’ […]. The evidence also indicates that we are more likely to mimic the verbal and nonverbal behaviour of people whom we like or are attracted to […]. This means that we are in turn more likely to be attracted to those who mirror our behaviours. Thus, therapists who use matching postures are perceived by clients to be affiliative and empathic, and this in turn encourages greater interviewee disclosure (Hess et al., 1999).”

“Gaze refers primarily to looking at another in the facial area. Mutual gaze happens when the other reciprocates. This is sometimes also referred to as eye contact when the eyes are the specific target, although just how accurately we can judge whether someone is looking us directly in the eye or merely in that region of the face is open to debate. Associated terms are gaze omission where gaze is absent and gaze avoidance where it is intentionally being withheld. When gaze becomes fixed and focused in an intrusive way that may infringe norms of politeness, it becomes a stare and is associated with a different set of social meanings and potential reactions.
Gazing during social interaction can serve a variety of purposes. In an early analysis, Kendon (1967) suggested these were primarily to do with expressing emotional information, regulating interaction, revealing cognitive activity and monitoring feedback from the other. More recent classifications […] are elaborate differentiations of these core functions, but add the further purpose of marking the relationship.”

“Catching someone’s eye is the necessary first step to opening up channels of communication and seeking contact with them. In a group discussion, patterns of gazing are used to orchestrate the flow of conversation, with members being brought into play at particular points. In dyads, a typical interactive sequence would be person A coming towards the end of an utterance looking at person B to signal that it is B’s turn to speak. B, in turn, looks away after a short period of mutual gaze to begin responding, especially if intending to speak for a long time, or if the message is difficult to formulate in words. Person A will continue to look reasonably consistently while B, as speaker, will have a more broken pattern of glances (Argyle, 1994). […] We tend to avoid gaze when processing difficult material in order to minimise distractions. Thus, there is a greater likelihood of gaze being avoided when attempting to answer more difficult questions […] speakers gaze periodically to obtain feedback and make judgements about how their message is being received and adjustments that may need to be made to their delivery. […] We make more and longer eye contact with people we regard positively and from whom we expect a positive reaction”

August 1, 2014 Posted by | Books, Psychology | Leave a comment