A few papers
From the European Public Choice Society’s meeting this year. There’s a lot more stuff here.
Last I was home I found out that the idea that managers might decide to deliberately ‘boost their numbers’ in various ways strategically some time before leaving for another job was something my parents had never even considered. I find it obvious that politicians from time to time decide to employ similar strategies by trying to make the important numbers look good up to the election and then take the hit a year or two later, once they’re in office.
3. Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology? From the concluding remarks:
“Considering all these results, a critical and cautious examination of them leads to the conviction that we cannot draw any strong conclusion: while there is some evidence that a deterrent effect might exist, it is too fragile to be sure about it and the possible quantitative effect usually measured by the number of homicides prevented by each execution is so uncertain that it is difficult to conclude anything that would be relevant for policy purposes.”
4. Beneﬁt Morale and Cross-Country Diversity in Sick Pay Insurance. From the abstract:
“We analyze the impact of beneﬁt morale on sick pay entitlement levels in a political economy framework. Stronger beneﬁt morale reduces the number of recipients. On one hand this reduces the probability of receiving beneﬁts, on the other hand it makes insurance cheaper. Numerical simulations show that the probability eﬀect can dominate the price eﬀect and hence beneﬁt morale might decrease insurance levels.”
The ‘benefit morale’ mentioned is a social norm against beneﬁt fraud, so that you don’t claim benefits if you’re not sick. And yeah, I know I’ve linked to it before but I should probably leave a link to this every time I publish a post like this with multiple studies.
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